Google’s latest flagship smartphone raises concerns about user privacy and security. It frequently transmits private user data to the tech giant before any app is installed. Moreover, the Cybernews research team has discovered that it potentially has remote management capabilities without user awareness or approval.
Cybernews researchers analyzed the new Pixel 9 Pro XL smartphone’s web traffic, focusing on what a new smartphone sends to Google.
“Every 15 minutes, Google Pixel 9 Pro XL sends a data packet to Google. The device shares location, email address, phone number, network status, and other telemetry. Even more concerning, the phone periodically attempts to download and run new code, potentially opening up security risks,” said Aras Nazarovas, a security researcher at Cybernews…
… “The amount of data transmitted and the potential for remote management casts doubt on who truly owns the device. Users may have paid for it, but the deep integration of surveillance systems in the ecosystem may leave users vulnerable to privacy violations,” Nazarovas said…
GrapheneOS
Do they have passkeys yet
Edit: passkeys support. Last year when I checked they didn’t support pass keys yet.
What does that even mean? It’s not the function of an OS to have passkeys.
Grapheneos didn’t support pass keys last year when I checked, so you couldn’t use them at all. There was some APIs broken/missing between the OS to browser comms so you couldn’t use 3rd party apps for pass keys, like proton or bit warden. I have been actively experimenting and adopting passkeys and didn’t want to revert. It sounds like there is support now though, so I will give it a try soon.
Yes, @oranki@lemmy.world wrote a great article about that: https://oranki.net/posts/2024-07-10-passkeys-on-grapheneos/
Thank you! Idk why I was down voted, I appreciate it. I did a bunch of research on grapheneos last year around this time and it wasn’t supported yet.
Yeah there’s also a relevant post on the GrapheneOS forum where this was discussed in detail, but I can’t find it anymore
No worries, ya I looked into it about a year ago when I was seeing if I could make the switch, glad there is support now.
I think I found it https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/12019-passkeys-as-mfa-on-grapheneos-a-guide
It might also be this one, I don’t remember https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/8184-graphene-os-3rd-party-passkey-support-on-android-14
I’m not sure because I’m on a OnePlus device running a lineage OS.
What a fucking useless comment
Yep, I’ve got a Pixel 9 Pro and I don’t even have a Google account on this thing.
Installing GrapheneOS removes all the Google crap.
What is the advantage over Calyx/Lineage/iode OS on compatible devices? I just don’t want Google to have any of my money at all. Buying a privacy solution from them recoups their loss.
It’s my understanding that Graphene has security as its main goal, not privacy, though it’s also quite private.
I don’t know about Calyx or Iode but Lineage doesn’t allow for a locked bootloader. This is a massive security hole and without security, sooner or later, your privacy will be violated.
Currently, GrapheneOS on a newer Pixel are the only phones that Celebrite can’t breach. Celebrite machines are cheap enough that the border guards and your local cops probably have one. In my country, it’s the law that a cop is allowed to examine a phone during a traffic stop.
In my country, it’s the law that a cop is allowed to examine a phone during a traffic stop.
One underrated feature of the Graphene OS is that you can set a duress PIN that wipes your entire phone when entered.
I have the duress pin/password set, the pin is written on a post-it in the case.
I should clarify, the cop can give the phone a once over but not connect to a machine or clone the phone. Cloning is a bit more involved - legally speaking.
Oh, I was mostly leaving the comment for other people who might be interested in the feature.
the pin is written on a post-it in the case.
That’s not a bad idea. If someone steals the phone, they might inadvertently erase it for you if they find that post-it.
Mainly the locked bootloader that GrapheneOS offers. It’s more secure, and GrapheneOS emphasizes security over all else, but privacy features are part of that security.
As well as all the other security features offered by Pixels, like the Titan M2 secure element, which securely stores encryption keys and makes brute-force attacks basically impossible.
Other OSs let you lock the bootloader too. I know that iodéOS and CalyxOS do, for example.
I like calyx, might try graphene some day. But I absolutely won’t run Google’s play services ala graphene. It’s sandboxed, supposedly, but why run it at all?
Calyx uses microG, a much smaller, fully open source emulator of Google’s services.
@RubberElectrons @multi_regime_enjoyer its not actually fully open source, it uses a lot of closed-source libraries, and its not as battle-tested as google’s official one so there really isn’t a reason to use it
Just about all of your identifying data is stripped out by the framework before interacting with Google at all: https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Google-Network-Connections
That alone makes it an important tool. I’m not too worried about memory exploits as I don’t really install apps, but it’s an important feature in graphene’s toolkit.
For most people who want an Android alternative that’s open source but don’t have time to fiddle with it, calyxOS seems like a good solution. It just works out of the box.
Just about all of your identifying data is stripped out by the framework before interacting with Google at all
For all of them, we strip device identifier (MAC addresses, IMEI, etc)
This is literally nothing special, as all user-installed apps are denied access to identifiers like the IMEI and MAC address since Android 10. Since GrapheneOS isolates Play services in the Android application sandbox, they don’t have access to any of these identifiers either.
I’m not too worried about memory exploits as I don’t really install apps
That’s not how memory corruption exploits work. These can occur anywhere in the system, and just need to be triggered by an attacker. This doesn’t require you to install an app, receiving a rogue message might for example be enough to exploit a memory vulnerability in the SMS app. Visiting a rogue website, which loads malicious JavaScript can be enough to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability in the Chromium WebView. That’s why GrapheneOS doesn’t just use hardened_malloc, but it also disables the JavaScript JIT compiler in Vanadium by default, and offers a toggle in the settings to disallow JavaScript JIT compilation in all apps making use of the system WebView component.
Very nice. Can I use the much smaller codebase of microG instead of Google’s? Even you do not know how Play Services actually works, and that’s a problem.
Further, a memory exploit that leads to compromise would need a chain of privilege escalation. There’s a lot in the way of making that trivial even on stock Android. And you know what helps reduce risk of exploit? Smaller codebases.
If you only care about security, you should keep Play Services isolated in a separate profile. That way, even if there happens to be a memory corruption vulnerability in Play services, which isn’t caught by hardened_malloc or the hardware MTE in newer devices with ARMv9 chips, the rest of your system would still be safe, since Play services aren’t running as root, and in order to compromise the entire system, there would need to be a privilege escalation vulnerability in all of Android, not just Play services.
And you know what helps reduce risk of exploit? Smaller codebases.
Why does CalyxOS include the F-Droid privileged extension then? It’s yet another component running with elevated permissions and unnecessarily increasing attack surface. Why does it include Google’s eUICC component with elevated privileges and no proper sandboxing?
but why run it at all?
Because it is unfortunately required by some apps. microG is not a viable alternative, as it requires root access on the device, which drastically reduces the security. It also has worse compatibility than Sandboxed Play services, and doesn’t offer much of a benefit. It still downloads and executes proprietary Google blobs in the background in order to function. Apps that require Google services also include a proprietary Google library, making microG essentially useless. It’s an open source layer that sits between a proprietary library and a proprietary network service, using proprietary binaries and requiring root access. You gain absolutely nothing from using it, and significantly increases the attack surface of your device.
fully open source emulator
This is simply false, as I explained, only a tiny bit of what microG requires to function is open source
You’re far better off using Sandboxed Play services on GrapheneOS
Dude I’m looking at the source code, there’s only a binary downloaded for enabling Safety net. Why are you making false statements?
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Calyx doesn’t actually support Google Play Services or Google Services Framework. It uses microG, a sometimes buggy workaround that requires root access and has pretty poor compatibility. GrapheneOS on the other hand uses the official Google Play binaries, but isolates them in the Android application sandbox, instead of installing them as system apps with special privileges (like it is the case on stock Android). You can read more about it at https://grapheneos.org/features#sandboxed-google-play
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Can you elaborate on MicroG needing root? To my understanding that is only required on ROMs that don’t require Sig. Spoofing, and Calyx does support it, specifically and only for MicroG.
I’m not entirely sure if all of microG needs to run as root, but I’m pretty sure that some parts do. Nonetheless, microG runs in the
priv_appSELinux domain instead ofuntrusted_app, reducing the isolation and granting it more access to sensitive APIs. Sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS on the other hand is a normal application that can be installed and uninstalled by the user, running in theuntrusted_appdomain. It is tightly controlled by the Android permission mechanism, and doesn’t have any permissions by default.
I know this isn’t the topic here, but I really wish these researchers would unroll what all Apple harvests from Apple devices. It’s quite a lot as well. Could help pop that “we’re so private” myth.
You can’t say no to Google’s surveillance
Yes you can: https://grapheneos.org/
I was just wondering earlier today if Google kept the bootloader open to allow custom OS installation only because they had other hardware on the phone that would send them their information anyways, possibly through covert side channels.
Like they could add listeners for cell signals that pick up data encoded in the lower bits of timestamps attached to packets, which would be very difficult to detect (like I’m having trouble thinking of a way to determine if that’s happening even if you knew to look for it).
Or maybe there’s a sleeper code that can be sent to “wake up” the phone’s secret circuitry and send bulk data when Google decides they want something specific (since encoding in timestamps would be pretty low bandwidth), which would make detection by traffic analysis more difficult, since most of the time it isn’t sending anything at all.
This is just speculation, but I’ve picked up on a pattern of speculating that something is technically possible, assuming there’s no way they’d actually be doing that, and later finding out that it was actually underestimating what they were doing.
I don’t mean to discredit your opinion, but it is pure speculation and falls in the category of conspiracy theories. There are plenty of compelling arguments, why this is likely completely wrong:
- Google Pixels have less than 1% of the global smartphone market share, in fact, they are currently only sold in
12(the Pixel 9 is sold in 32 countries, my bad, I had an outdated number in mind) countries around the world. Do you really think that Google would spend all the money in research, custom manufacturing, software development and maintenance to extract this tiny bit of data from a relatively small number of users? I’d say more than 90% of Pixel owners use the Stock OS anyways, so it really doesn’t matter. And Google has access to all the user data on around 70% of all the smartphones in the world through their rootkits (Google Play services and framework, which are installed as system apps and granted special privileges), which lets them collect far more data than they ever could from Pixel users. - Keeping this a secret would also immensely difficult and require even more resources, making this even less profitable. Employees leave the company all the time, after which they might just leak the story to the press, or the company could get hacked and internal records published on the internet. Since this would also require hardware modifications, it’s also likely that it would get discovered when taking apart and analyzing the device. PCB schematics also get leaked all the time, including popular devices like several generations of iPhones and MacBooks.
- Lastly, the image damage would be insane, if this ever got leaked to the public. No one would ever buy any Google devices, if it was proven that they actually contain hardware backdoors that are used to exfiltrate data.
You’re right that it’s pure speculation just based on technical possibilities and I hope you’re right to think it should be dismissed.
But with the way microchip design (it wouldn’t be at the PCB level, it would be hidden inside the SoC) and manufacturing work, I think it’s possible for a small number of people to make this happen, maybe even a single technical actor on the right team. Chips are typically designed with a lot of diagnostic circuitry that could be used to access arbitrary data on the chip, where the only secret part is, say, a bridge from the cell signal to that diagnostic bus. The rest would be designed and validated by teams thinking it’s perfectly normal (and it is, other than leaving an open pathway to it).
Then if you have access to arbitrary registers or memory on the chip, you can use that to write arbitrary firmware for one of the many microprocessors on the SoC (which isn’t just the main CPU cores someone might notice has woken up and is running code that came from nowhere), and then write to its program counter to make it run that code, which can then do whatever that MP is capable of.
I don’t think it would be feasible for mass surveillance, because that would take infrastructure that would require a team that understands what’s going on to build, run, and maintain.
But it could be used for smaller scale surveillance, like targeted at specific individuals.
But yeah, this is just speculation based on what’s technically possible and the only reason I’m giving it serious thought is because I once thought that it was technically possible for apps to listen in on your mic, feed it into a text to speech algorithm, and send it back home, hidden among other normal packets, but they probably aren’t doing it. But then I’d hear so many stories about uncanny ads that pop up about a discussion in the presence of the phone and more recently it came out that FB was doing that. So I wouldn’t put it past them to actually do something like this.
But it could be used for smaller scale surveillance, like targeted at specific individuals
Why would this only be present in Pixels then? Google isn’t interested in specific people. Intelligence agencies are. This would mean, that every phone in the world needs to be compromised using this sophisticated, stealthy technology, which is even more unlikely.
If it is present there, it doesn’t imply it’s only present there.
And we really have no idea how close of a relationship Google, or any other corp for that matter, has with various intelligence agencies. Same thing with infiltrations by intelligence agencies.
And no, it doesn’t mean that every phone in the world is compromised with this, which wouldn’t be that sophisticated, just stealthy. The sophisticated part would be part of the normal design process, it’s called DFT or design for test if you want to read about it, used legitimately to determine what parts of the chip have manufacturing flaws for chip binning.
Most phones don’t have an unlocked bootloader, and this post is about the data Google is pulling on factory pixels.
Why would they do all the work on the software side and then themselves offer a device that allows you to remove their software entirely? And if it’s worth it just from the “make more money from people who only want unlocked phones”, why isn’t it more common?
Mind you, my next phone might still be a pixel. Even if this stuff is actually there, I wouldn’t expect to be targeted. I can’t help but wonder about it, though, like just how deep does the surveillance or surveillance potential go?
And we really have no idea how close of a relationship Google, or any other corp for that matter, has with various intelligence agencies
Ok let’s assume this is true, and US intelligence agencies have actually backdoored all US phone manufacturers. What about foreign phones? If this was true, someone the NSA is interested in could just defend themselves by e.g. buying a Chinese phone. All this effort, just to be defeated by foreign phone manufacturers? It wouldn’t be worth it, which is why it’s so highly unlikely.
Well to this point (I don’t 100% believe this flavor of state surveillance theory but) you cannot buy phones made my foreign manufacturers
and have them work in the US. For example, Oppo, Huawei, Xiaomi, all do not work on USA cell networks, andyou can’t buy them unless you go through an import process. Just to name a few of the many. But granted, those are all Chinese manufacturers. EDIT** I was wrong, apparently with the right settings you can get most phones to work on US cell networksThis argument assumes that they’d only do something if they could get perfect coverage, which isn’t very compelling for me. IMO the question should be “would it give enough access to more information to be worth it”, not “it’s only worth it if it gives access to all information”.
And, as the other commenter mentioned, it is difficult to get some Chinese phones, though not impossible and if this whole line of thought plays into that, the reasoning is probably as much about cutting off their access to this kind of thing as it would be about making it harder to avoid western agencies doing this. They’ve said the first one out loud (they being politicians justifying blocking Huawei), and wouldn’t have said the second part either way.
- Google Pixels have less than 1% of the global smartphone market share, in fact, they are currently only sold in
This is just speculation, but I’ve picked up on a pattern of speculating that something is technically possible, assuming there’s no way they’d actually be doing that, and later finding out that it was actually underestimating what they were doing.
As the saying goes, just because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean you’re wrong.
The answer that will put this question to bed is open source hardware. Thankfully we’re close to having viable options, finally.
I will never understand buying a google phone just to deGoogle it. why would you give them money.
I’ve seen the reasoning, I just …
@averyminya @Andromxda grapheneos is SOTA of android security, and it only supports pixels, thats why
Right, like I said I’ve seen the reasoning. It just seems like giving money to the very company you’re all trying to avoid, which in turn is just funding for Google to be more invasive.
Playing them for hardware only is different from paying for hardware and then providing all your personal information 24/7 to them.
@averyminya bought it secondhand, problem solved
Certainly helps!
Because I want a secure phone with relatively good specs, relatively good design, battery life and camera quality. And because it is one of the very few devices with a user-unlockable and re-lockable bootloader.
Who truly owns the device is a question that has been answered ever since Android came into being.
Ask yourself: do you have root access to YOUR phone? No you don’t: Google does.
It’s the so-called “Android security model”, which posits that the users are too dumb to take care of themselves, so Google unilaterally decides to administer their phone on their behalf without asking permission.
Which of course has nothing to do with saving the users from their own supposed stupidity and everything to do with controlling other people’s private property to exfiltrate and monetize their data.
How this is even legal has been beyond me for 15 years.
Please read the many write-ups by developers of well regarded privacy and security ROMs, such as grapheneOS and divestOS.
Who detail in great length why root access is a bad idea, and why many apps that require root access, are just poorly developed security nightmares.
That said, I agree that it should be an option, or at least a standardized means of enabling it. As well as all bootloaders should be unlockable. But phones are more personal devices than the PC ever was, and there are good reasons NOT to push for the proliferation of standardized root access.
These writeups never managed to to convince me me that I should not be able to modify any file on my device. If the system is not able to grant this access to me, and me only, while doing it securely, than it’s bad operating system, designed without my interests first on mind. I am absolutely sure that granting so-called “root access” can be done securely, as decades of almost-every-other-OS have shown.
Yes. It is the principle, everyone should be informed of the security risks, but not stripped of the root privileges they keep for themselves.
I have GrapheneOS and I know having root is not ideal and I was wondering about https://shizuku.rikka.app/ It looks like a more elegant way to have for some apps higher privileges while preserving security but I’m not sure about it so I’m thinking out loud
I will admit that I also use Shizuku, but I only enable it for short bursts when I need access for a very select number of precise use cases. Immediately afterwards, I reboot.
I also assume that if I spent any amount of time digging into it, I would realize it’s a bad idea, but nothing’s perfect.
And don’t assume that all apps allowing Shizuku access were developed securely, or that there all developers have good intentions. Really I only use it for Swift, or if I’m really behind on my updates, I’ll briefly allow Droidify access for hands off updating.
Is rebooting disables Shizuku?
How do you do these short bursts? Through adb?
And still Shizuku seems like a better idea than rooting the smartphone.
Weirdly, Pixels are actually the best Android phones for installing custom ROMs, at least out of the major manufacturers. So for me, there isn’t another choice, because I can finance a Pixel, and I can’t finance a Fairphone or something.
GrapheneOS is really the furthest away from Google you can get on an Android phone and it’s mainly developed for Pixel.
do you have root access to YOUR phone?
Yes. On a Pixel 9 Pro Fold.
Ironically, Google Pixels are among the few (US available) brands that still let you fully unlock the BL
Yes. On a Pixel 9 Pro Fold.
Not if you run the stock OS you don’t.
My comment was generic. The vast majority of Android users don’t unlock their bootloader and install a custom ROM. The people who do that are fringe users.
My point was that when the normal state of affairs is Google controlling YOUR property that YOU paid with YOUR hard-earned, and you have to be technically competent and willing to risk bricking your device to regain control, that’s full-blown dystopia right there.
out of interest, what use cases do you have in mind that require root access?
I used to use a root based solution to block ads system wide via hosts but now I just use ublock origin in Firefox.
AdAway, AFWall+ (for restricting network access to apps), Root File Explorer (needed to get my watch working with GadgetBridge), Permission Manager X, Xposed Edge Pro (for hardware keys remapping), Pixels (for a hardware display fix)
Adaway was what I used prior to ublock origin on Firefox. The network access toggles can be found directly in ROMs like Calyx Grapene, Lineage, Divest, though I’m not sure if they’re widely seen elsewhere.
I know the process you’re referring you WRT gadgetbridge. I used to do the same thing until I switched to a pinetime.
I’m not familiar with permission manager X. Does that deviate from the android permissions framework in some way?
Can you tell me more about the hardware tweaks?
Permission Manager X gives the user fine grain control over pretty much every permission an app has, moreso than the built in Android permissions settings. I was trying to use it to keep certain apps from starting automatically at boot.
As far as the hardware tweaks, my Xperia has an “assistant button” on the side of the phone, but since I don’t use google assistant or anything, Xposed Edge Pro lets me remap it to do basically anything, even when the screen is off. I have it set to play/pause my music even when the screen is off, but only if headphones are connected.
I see. I admit I sorely missed the app startup at boot control permission (app ops) toggle when it was removed from the Android permissions framework, but the new power and background software management framework eliminates the need for it.
Also damn, you have a modern xperia? Hardware wise they are massively appealing to me. They have nearly all of the HW amenities I can think of (SD card slot, headphone jack, dedicated FP reader / button, notification LED, no camera cutout).
If they supported bootloader relocking with sself signed keys, they’d be the perfect phone for me.
I made the admittedly difficult discussion to move to a Pixel so I could use some of the most private and secure software possible on android with little effort or thought behind it.
I sorely miss my headphone jack but at least I feel like I can depend on this tiny computer to not fuck me over with unfettered personal data collection (and save a lot of power in doing so, I suppose).
That only blocks for the browser. What about your apps? I never see add banners or popups in apps as i use adaway. Further, I can customize with well maintained blocklists that include other categories like malware and harvesting sites.
I’m aware, I used to use adaway several years ago.
I had the same feelings as you, in that I needed to have system-wide ad blocking, but I revaluated that requirement a couple years ago and realised that I don’t use any apps featuring banner ads and such.
Several of my apps will just fall back to system webview and Firefox (+uBo) will power that too.
what use cases do you have in mind that require root access?
Ownership.
Nah. The only thing root does is massively decrease security. To actually own your phone, you need to install a proper, FOSS, private and secure OS in the first place. Pixels are great, because they support GrapheneOS.
I own my Pixel 8 Pro. No root. GrapheneOS. So, your logic is therefore flawed.
okay cool but what are you specifically using system or systemless root for now?
And this is different from Apple. Right? Right?
The only real difference is that Google pretends to be open and Apple pretends to be privacy-focused. It’s the illusion of choice. They’re both selling their users’ data to the same people.
Spot on.
Yep, what radicalized me against Google was all the way back when they had bought Android and rolled out the Play Store for the first time.
I was on my first-ever phone, and yes, it did have rather limited internal storage, but then the Play Store got installed, taking up all the remaining space. I had literally around 500KB of free storage left afterwards, making it impossible to install new apps.
Couldn’t uninstall the Play Store, couldn’t move it to the SD-card and it didn’t even fucking do anything that the Android Market app didn’t do. It just took up 40MB more space for no good reason.
What’s surprising about their stock ROM having tracking and phoning home? Use Grapheneos.
You still have to trust their black box Titan security chip that’s only in Pixels, that they pinky promised to open source but never did.
You will have to inevitably trust someone somewhere for every phone, unfortunately. At least the Titan has been tested in the real world, and it’s not like it’s phoning home on it’s own or anything.
This doesn’t seem surprising at all. Isn’t that what Google Play Services is for? If you don’t want it, custom ROMs are easily installed.
GrapheneOS + buy your phone from a store in-case you’re allergic to PETN
It’s so ironic that Pixels are the go to devices for privacy roms these days.
All this shit is probably happening at the hardware level too, with 100 different backdoors you can’t remove with your megamind plan of installing a custom rom.
The silicon probably has the ability to live stream all sensor data directly to the NSA using the fanciest ML compression technology lmao.
It’s so ironic that Pixels are the go to devices for privacy roms these days.
It’s so ironic it’s a show-stopper for me. I’m not paying fucking Google to escape the Google dystopia. Nosiree! That’s just too rich for me.
This is why I own a Fairphone running CalyxOS. Yes, I know GrapheneOS is supposedly more secure - I say supposedly because I think 95% of users don’t have a threat model that justifies the extra security really. But I don’t care: my number one priority is not giving Google a single cent. If it means running a less secure OS, I’m fine with that.
There’s no way on God’s green Earth I’m buying a Pixel phone to run a deGoogled OS. That’s such an insane proposition I don’t even know how anybody can twist their brain into believing this is a rational thing to do.
I think some people buy used/refurbished.
Wait for the 9 to hit refurb market, boom. Google phone without paying Google.
That’s why I buy my phones used or refurbished. It’s also cheaper and more environmentally friendly.
What if you buy a used Pixel? Google was already getting that money, but you haven’t paid them…or would that just be a cop out?
I’ve been arguing this many times with many people, and everybody seems to adopt their own way of interpreting things to suit their preferences.
Here’s my line of thinking:
- If the first buyer buys a Google cellphone new for, say, $500 (no idea of the price, just making it up for the sake of explaining), this buyer gives $500 to Google
- If I then buy this cellphone second-hand for, say, $300, the original buyer gets $300 back, meaning Google now has $300 of my money.
That’s a hard no.
Of course, there’s the argument that Google got $500 no matter what and they don’t know who the money is from. But that’s besides the point: I know Google got my money. I most defintely parted with $300 to acquire a Google cellphome, meaning as far as I’m concerned, I indirectly gave Google $300 of my money. And I refuse to give Google any money, however indirect the transaction might be. The only way I could become the owner of a Google phone is if someone gave one to me, I found it in the trash or I stole it.
There’s also the argument that if I don’t buy the cellphone, it might end up in a landfill, so if I’m environmentally-minded, I should save it from the landfill. That’s true, but my counter-argument to this is that a healthy second-hand market for Google phones gives them more value, therefore makes them more appealing to potential buyers and ultimately supports Google’s business.
I don’t like serviceable stuff being landfilled for no good reason (otherwise I wouldn’t pay extra to buy a Fairphone) but in the case of Google hardware, I reckon it should end up at the landfill as often as possible to diminish its value and hurt Google. Of course, I’m only one meaningless guy, but I reckon boycotting Google is a moral duty for anybody who’s concerned about privacy and civil liberties.
And of course, I don’t want a Google product in my pocket because it would make me nauseous. But that’s entirely subjective.
I say supposedly because I think 95% of users don’t have a threat model that justifies the extra security really.
Does street cred with my Cybersecurity peers count as a threat model?
I’m definitely one of the users of GrapheneOS that you’re talking about. My threat model is “this is fucking cool!”
Also, the grass is always greener on the other side. I want a Fair phone.
Citation needed. I get that it’s healthy not to trust anyone, but with the amount of security research that goes into these devices if something like that was happening then we would know about it.
- Applies to every phone, smart or simple, can be combatted with a £5 Faraday bag
- That is about monitoring by your network, nothing to do with the phone manufacturer really
- A ten year old article about Samsung phones
- An exploit affecting lots of phones that seems like it was fixed
So a few interesting points, but nothing even slightly like what OP was suggesting.
can be combatted with a £5 Faraday bag
I don’t consider that a reasonable solution for most people, and there are many posts claiming those almost never work well enough. You could also make the argument that it shouldn’t be necessary in the first place.
That is about monitoring by your network
I don’t think it matters to most people, as you are still tracked by having the phone physically with you, which is what people are against.
A ten year old article about Samsung phones
Are you suggesting Samsung phones should have ever been allowed to spy on people? Or that this doesn’t highlight a bigger issue? I don’t see why this should get a pass at all.
An exploit affecting lots of phones that seems like it was fixed
I think it’s very much a real threat, and leaked docs show world governments and bad actors actively use such exploits routinely for years, including keeping previously unknown exploits a secret to use for themselves.
I understand your desire to turn talking points into nothingburgers but I feel like this is not only disingenuous but against the entire principal of security and privacy. Of course we all have our own individual threat models, but to dismiss another person’s model because you think it shouldn’t matter to anyone, doesn’t seem like a good idea to me.
Look, I’m not trying to say there aren’t real security/privacy issues that aren’t being exploited right now, my citation needed was regarding this comment:
The silicon probably has the ability to live stream all sensor data directly to the NSA using the fanciest ML compression technology lmao.
The articles you linked are real issues that have been documented, OP was arguing that Google phones specifically are bad because of this statement they pulled out of their arse.
Maybe and maybe not. We need to encourage robust alternatives, unfortunately this requires a ton of capital to develop hardware and reserve fab time and get your devices fabricated instead of a major player like Google or Samsung.
We basically need something in the smartphone space equivalent to the Framework laptop, that can meet the security hardware requirements, allow bootloader unlock/relock and support GrapheneOS and other custom ROMs.
So what phones do you all have?
Pixel 7 Pro with GrapheneOS
pixel 6a with graphene os
not a phone just a literal block of graphene
How can it be a block? I thought graphene was like a one atom thick layer of graphite? If you want to make a block, you need to stack them, making graphite, not graphene.
Pixel 8a with graphene
Pencil with graphite
stone and chisel
Oooga booga
iPhone 16 Pro Max, but Graphene does look dope.
Pixel 7 pro with GrapheneOS.
Is there a noticeable performance and/or battery life improvement when phone is on GOS?
In my experience, no. Since Google doesn’t apply any battery optimizations in their stock OS, apart from those already present in AOSP, it makes sense that battery life is essentially the same in GrapheneOS.
Fairphone 5
pixel 7a with crdroid
deleted by creator
Sony Xperia 1 iii – LineageOS w/microG
I’d say newer Pixels have even more privacy issues than the older ones because of cloud based AI features (ugh when will the bubble finally pop?) and stuff. However the stock OS is bad for privacy in both cases so a custom ROM is a must and afaik installing it on a Pixel is not too hard. Also new Pixels seem to get custom ROMs very quickly so you don’t have to wait for months or even years for someone to make one.
The Pixel 9 line had GrapheneOS avaliable a couple of days after launch. That’s how fast. You order the phone, and by the time you got it, GrapheneOS was ready to replace Stock Android.
