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As Canada pursues trade diversification, it must be careful not to replace its dependence on the U.S. with a new dependence on China.
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Interdependence is not the same as trust
Economic ties cannot be separated from political and security relationships. When trade is concentrated, governments can use access to supplies or export markets as leverage in disputes.
During the trade disputes of the 1980s [between Japan and the U.S.], Washington pressured Tokyo to open its markets. Japanese carmakers such as Honda and Toyota built plants across North America, including in Ontario, creating jobs and embedding Japanese investment in North America.
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Canada has encountered a … vulnerability. After imposing 100 per cent tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, China responded with tariffs on canola. Exports to China subsequently fell 62 per cent.
A deal reached in January lowered canola tariffs in exchange for allowing 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into Canada annually at a 6.1 per cent tariff.
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Japan’s experience highlights two lessons in Canada’s push to diversify trade. The first is that an economic slowdown does not necessarily make a country an insignificant trading partner. Japan remained a wealthy and important market long after its property bubble burst.
China, however, could face prolonged stagnation before reaching Japan’s level of affluence. If Chinese demand weakens, commodities producers [such as Canada] will have to compete for a smaller pool of buyers.
The second lesson is that the political relationship behind trade can matter as much as trade volume. Japan’s ties with the U.S. survived disputes partly because they ran both ways: Japanese firms built plants in North America, and the two countries shared security interests.
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Canada’s relationship with China is more asymmetric. Much of the trade involves Canadian commodities flowing one way, with market access Beijing can grant or withdraw. Trading dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing would simply replace one vulnerability with another.
Canada’s priority should be to expand its customer base. Its Pacific coast can ship crude, gas and critical minerals to Asia, while the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership gives Canada preferential access to Japan and other Indo-Pacific markets.
Trading with more countries is not the same as having more freedom to choose. The goal is to ensure that no single partner — whether rival or ally — can set the terms.
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Did the Chinese propaganda ministry write your comment?
The article is pretty clear that Canada “must be careful not to replace its dependence on the U.S. with a new dependence on China.” It makes a lot of very good points.
Edit:
As Vina Nadjibulla, Co-Founder and CEO at the Centre for Strategic Statecraft writes in a recent comment:
Nadjibulla urges Canada to engage further with partners other than China:
Other partners would include the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Europe, amongst others.
The article starts with this:
Prime Minister Mark Carney has set a target of doubling exports to countries other than the U.S. over the next decade.
I feel like those other countries you named are also included?
I’m saying we could increase trade with China 1000% and still not have the same trade we do with the US.