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xiaohongshu [none/use name]

@ xiaohongshu @hexbear.net

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1 yr. ago

  • Trump questions support for son of Iran's last Shah inside country Reuters

    Trump has repeatedly threatened to intervene in support of protesters in Iran, where thousands of people have been reported killed in a crackdown on the unrest against clerical rule. But he was reluctant on Wednesday to lend his full support to Pahlavi, the son of the late shah of Iran, who was ousted from power in 1979.

    "He seems very nice, but I don't know how he'd play within his own country," Trump said. "And we really aren't up to that point yet. "I don't know whether or not his country would accept his leadership, and certainly if they would, that would be fine with me."

    Trump's comments went further in questioning Pahlavi's ability to lead Iran, after he said last week that he had no plans to meet with him.

    Chinese automakers' US entry beneficial for both sides, analysts say, but caution potential risks after Trump's 'let China come in' remarks on US carmakers Global Times

    US President Donald Trump, during a Michigan visit, openly invited Chinese automakers to build factories in the US, noting they would create jobs using American labor, while he balanced the call with continued tariffs on imported Chinese vehicles. Analysts see potential openings from the remarks, adding that Chinese automakers' entry to the US is beneficial for both sides, but warn of major political, regulatory and market risks for Chinese firms.

    He made the remarks before an audience that includes many US auto industry executives during a visit to Michigan's Detroit, known as the heart of America's auto industry, on Tuesday local time.

    "Let China come in, let Japan come in," Trump said. "They are and they'll be building plants, but they're using our labor," he said during the Michigan trip, where he toured Ford's factory and delivered a roughly one-hour speech at the Detroit Economic Club, media reported.

    Industry insiders said that Trump's remarks could signal a pragmatic pivot: leveraging foreign capital for domestic gains without fully dismantling trade barriers. There could be a chance for Chinese automakers.

    Haha

  • You’re not thinking big enough. The goal is not for the Democrats to win, but to exert a disciplinary action against people (and by extension, the entire voting class) who think they can leverage the democratic system to blackmail the bourgeois ruling class.

    The message is not that “you have to vote Democrats next time”, it is “you are never going to get us to pander to you, so think carefully next time if you think you can undermine the system by sitting out the election. take what we offer and be grateful”.

  • This is to be expected. We already know that China switched from Venezuelan to Canadian crude since last November after the Trump-Xi meeting:

    So the US already gave China ample time to reroute its oil supply before the recent operation in Venezuela. It’s not hard to see that the US is picking off the anti-American countries one by one, from Venezuela to Iran, to gain control in Latin America and the Middle East.

    Meanwhile, China’s rapprochement with South Korea recently is also to be expected as the US withdraws from the Asia-Pacific region and letting Japan to take the brunt.

    If you think the US’s goal is to defeat China, then you’re thinking too small. The US wants to eat the entire globe.

  • In the early stages of the show. Now that these pioneering wave of podcasters have made it and accepted in mainstream, it’s time to pull the ladder up.

  • For a long time the bolivar was pegged to the dollar so this is simply how their economy operates. It was only turned into a free floating currency by the end of 2024 due to the deteriorating economy, so there is functionally no monetary sovereignty here. They don’t have and have not built up the institutions for it.

  • Everyone is reading this wrong. I have said it since Trump was elected the last time: the Democrats will want to maximize punishment for the voters who did not turn out for Kamala.

    Remember right after Trump’s (second) surprise victory, the libs were laying all the blame on pro-Palestinian supporters and the Latinos who went for Trump, and were screeching about deporting those Latinos back to their home countries?

    You might have forgotten, but the Democrats haven’t. This is one big punitive, disciplinary action: you want to support Palestine? We make sure Trump will make Gaza even worse. They did that. And they’ll continue to support ICE because they believe that the immigrant population has “betrayed” the role that has been assigned to them.

    They are sending a clear message: you did this. You did not vote for Kamala. And this is what you deserve. And we won’t pander to you anymore and we’ll do it on our terms. If you had any bargaining chance with us before, that is gone. Now go and enjoy the Trump presidency and experience how much you regret for not turning out for Kamala Harris.

    They want the pain to sting. The more painful it is, the more you’ll remember come election time why didn’t you vote the last time. How many people will fold? That’s the question.

  • This does not compute at all.

    Central banks accumulate gold precisely because they couldn’t find/settle on an alternative, so they are shifting the risks of dollar depreciation (and confiscation by US sanctions) to the speculative gold market, which fluctuates as much as S&P500! Clearly a worse alternative.

    There will be no BRICS alternative currency (or a bancor-like settlement unit). Read Russia’s proposal on de-dollarization that was published during the BRICS Kazan summit in 2024 - it is one of the best written paper on de-dollarization and the Russian side was unusually realistic about it. The “basket of currency” idea was pretty much dead by then.

    Here’s what Putin told Batista (who’s mentioned in the Escobar article) at the Valdai Discussion Club meeting in November 2024:

    BATISTA (former vice president of BRICS New Development Bank): I would like to ask you, Mr President, if you could expand a little on two topics you touched upon in your presentation and comments: BRICS and the US dollar.

    What role do you see for BRICS in constructing alternatives to the unreliable and dysfunctional dollar system? Russia proposed during its 2024 chairmanship of BRICS a detailed, interesting proposal for a new system of cross-border payments based on national currencies.

    My second point is a more difficult one. Don’t you agree that payments in national currencies have a limit and that we ultimately must move step-by-step, gradually and carefully towards new means of payment and a new reserve currency?

    PUTIN: … I have heard a lot of discussions at the expert and journalistic levels about the need to consider creating a single currency. However, it is too early to talk about that, and it is not a goal we have set for ourselves. To even consider a common currency, we would first need to achieve a higher level of economic integration among our countries. Secondly, the quality of our economies must reach a certain level, ensuring they are similar and compatible in terms of structure and performance. Anything beyond that would be unrealistic and could even be harmful. Therefore, there is no need to rush into this.

    I would like to conclude by reiterating something I often emphasise when answering questions like this. We never aimed to abandon the dollar, nor do we have such an intention. It is the political and financial authorities of the United States or Europe when they refuse to accept payments in euros. The euro has yet to establish itself as a global currency, and yet, they are undermining it themselves. It is absurd.

    Unfortunately Escobar has been selling the BRICS “basket of currency” idea on the alt-media sphere for so long that he’s essentially backed himself into a corner now that it has not and will not materialize. His articles often contain no sources and usually comprise of what his “high ranking officials” friends told him.

  • I also don’t use Twitter lol, only Russian telegram and various forms of Chinese social media.

    Here’s Andrey Medvedev’s telegram post about it (Russia’s premier journalist/propagandist at VGTRK):

    The argument that "we lost Iran" is unfounded for one main reason. To lose something, you first have to gain it. To obtain it.

    So, in this sense, Iran wasn't a Russian ally (in the sense that older people often understand it as "eternal ally forever and ever"). It was a tactical partner, and a rather difficult one at that. And it will likely remain so, even if the government changes.

    In Iran, history is well remembered (we've somewhat forgotten the history of the Caucasian campaigns). Who did Kotlyarevsky, Karyakin, Yermolov, Madatov-Karabakhsky, and Paskevich fight against? With whom did Griboyedov sign a peace treaty? Well, with Persia. In Tehran, they clearly remember that it was the Russians who took the South Caucasus from them and cut off their claims to Baku. And that the Qajar dynasty was significantly dependent on the will of the Russian Tsar is also not forgotten.

    Sometimes people are surprised to learn that Iranians are actively buying real estate in Yerevan. They simply consider Yerevan historically the property of Persia. In general, relations between Iran and Russia/the USSR were very complicated in the 19th and 20th centuries. I won't go into detail about Stalin's plans to take over northern Iran after the war. But Iranians remember this, and how the Soviet Army occupied Iran alongside the British until 1945.

    When the Ayatollahs came to power in Iran in 1979, the USSR naturally became Iran's adversary. Not least because Khomeini declared that "America is worse than England, England is worse than the Soviet Union, and the Soviets are worse than both." The USSR maintained a group on the Iranian border, Iran financed, trained, and armed the Afghan mujahideen (even before the US), and at the same time, the Ayatollahs slaughtered all the communists in the country. During the Iran-Iraq War, the USSR supported Saddam Hussein, signing a $13 billion arms contract. Before Desert Storm, the USSR maintained over 7,000 troops and specialists in Iraq.

    The Soviet navy escorted commercial transports, and they were paid for it. Overall, Iraq won the war with Iran largely thanks to Soviet support. However, aid to Iraq weakened Iran's support for the Afghan mujahideen.

    Iran and Russia began to literally rebuild their relations in the mid-1990s, but China remained Iraq's primary partner, and consequently, Pakistan, China's only ally. After 2014, the partnership became more focused, built around sanctions, the military industry, and the Syrian issue. The history of the Syrian war is a separate, larger topic. But Iran, in short, was trying to realize its goal of a Shiite belt in Syria, so Hezbollah was actively involved as a proxy. In fact, combat experience created a situation where Hezbollah controlled Lebanon. Russia was trying to eliminate the terrorists who posed a threat to us.

    At the time of the Assad regime's collapse, the IRGC group, Iranian proxies, and Afghan mercenaries numbered over 15,000. They abandoned many of their bases without warning the Russian military. That is, a tactical ally, a fellow traveler, isn't exactly a perpetual brotherhood in arms.

    We helped sell the Iranians their sanctioned oil, they helped us with parallel imports, we helped them with technology, and they helped us with Geraniums. However, the current Geranium only resembles the Iranian model in form. A normal "you give and I give you" relationship, without the promise of eternal friendship. And with the traditional Eastern smile and a fig in the pocket.

    Just remember when Russia proposed a strategic partnership to Iran, and when the Iranian parliament approved the agreement, and under what circumstances. I've written about the causes of the current crisis before. The enemy CIA and Mossad are certainly involved, but the Iranian authorities themselves created the base .

    So we didn't really lose anything. We have a difficult tactical partner, and one side has a historical grudge. It's not a given that the current Iranian government will collapse. The people dislike Pahlavi even more than the ayatollahs. But even if the government changes or serious reforms take place, the mutually beneficial aspect of the relationship will remain.

    Do they really love Russia in Turkey? In Saudi Arabia? But no one refuses money. Or problems that can only be solved together today, only to be abandoned tomorrow. The East, you know.

    ———

    Chinese social media invariably revolves around a few points:

    1. The Iranians sold out Huawei during the US sanctions and led to the detainment of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei CEO’s daughter in Canada
    2. The Iranians signed a “secret” $400 billion 25-year cooperation deal with China back in 2021 but instead used it as a bargaining chip to negotiate with the US and led to the public disclosure of the deal
    3. China’s Dalian port provided shelter for Iran’s sanctioned oil since Trump tore up the JCPOA in 2018 and racked up $450 million in port fee, refused to pay up and instead demanded China returning their oil in January 2025 (I wrote about this in a comment yesterday)
    4. Iran went to sign a defense pact with India after the India-Pakistan conflict in 2025, which was against Chinese interests

    A lot of painting the Iranians as “untrustworthy” partner and will only be a baggage for China down the road. You can verify the incidents above yourself, they are all public news.

  • See my comment from last week’s megathread on this topic. Disclaimer that I don’t pretend to understand what the Chinese government is thinking, so take with a huge grain of salt.

    I think a lot of people are overestimating how much China is dependent on countries like Iran and Venezuela for its energy supply. China must have run its calculations and figured that they are self-sufficient enough to not have to be dragged down in providing continuous support for these countries. After all, who’s not going to sell resources to China when their economy is so much more dependent on China?

    Many people are also underestimating how much China can leverage its cards to stop the US from decoupling from itself.

  • I strongly doubt the protests will go very far.

    For one, the nature of the protests have been spontaneous and sporadic in nature and did not coalesce into rallying behind a credible leader or movement with explicit demands (the Shah family is simply too out of touch for most Iranians to be considered a legitimate leader). Protests of such nature cannot succeed in toppling the government.

    However, this does not change the fact that the economic situation in Iran is extremely dire right now. This is not the slow burn from the sanctions for many years - the Iranian economy has been rapidly deteriorating since the 12-day war last June and is heading towards a falling off the cliff situation. If the ruling government cannot do anything to ease the spiraling inflation and the cost of living, then the domestic dissent can only grow.

    Most importantly, the US cannot afford to have Iran collapsing into a situation that spirals beyond its control. It has already achieved its goals of pushing Russia and China out of the region. If you go to the nationalist propaganda channels on Russian telegram and Chinese social media, both are placing much blame on the Iranian government (as well as Venezuela’s) while only voicing the minimum boilerplate support on the grounds of US hypocrisy and imperialism. That’s why we can be fairly confident in saying that both Russia and China will not interfere in the Iranian crisis (and Venezuela) this time.

    Recall what happened when the US hastily withdrew from Afghanistan back in 2021. The videos that emerged from it became a “last chopper out of Kabul” joke, happening at a pace so rapid that the US was conveniently throwing away a lot of their equipments behind to be freely looted by the Taliban. Many predicted that the Taliban government would let in Chinese and Russian investments, but that did not materialize at all and the cooperation that transpired has been minimal at best.

    It’s been 4.5 years and what we’re seeing is the Taliban government very conveniently staying out of its way from causing trouble to the empire’s actions in the region. This could represent a new form of US exerting its imperial control - instead of explicit regime change, it simply has to drive out economic investments from foreign adversaries and the economic pressure will soon lead those extant regimes to come to a compromise with the US.

    We may be seeing the same thing happening in Venezuela and Iran. The US simply has to wait. It’s not as if the liberal Iranian government is not open to a negotiation with the US (the IRGC will not, but the economic sanction is already biting on their ruling legitimacy). Raisi would have been more firm against the US, but Pezeshkian seems quite open to a compromise with the US. And that is likely the final outcome we will see with Iran.

  • China’s secret plan to turn RMB into the global reserve currency

  • This is from last month but I somehow missed it. Still very much worth noting:

    IMF Shanghai center begins operation; new hub signifies China’s growing role in regional, global economy: expert Global Times

    The IMF on Monday officially launched the operations of its center in Shanghai. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, People's Bank of China (PBC) Governor Pan Gongsheng, and Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng attended the opening ceremony, the PBC said in a statement on Monday. The move signifies China's growing role in both regional and global economic governance, Chinese experts noted.

    Pan said that the operations of the IMF Shanghai centers fully demonstrates China's firm stance on advocating win-win cooperation with the IMF, and is of great significance for deepening cooperation between the IMF and China, promoting macroeconomic policy exchanges and coordination among countries in the Asia-Pacific region, maintaining global and regional financial stability, and improving global financial governance, according to the PBC statement.

    The center will play an important role in enhancing the fund's engagement with the dynamic Asia and Pacific region. It will serve as a hub to promote research and knowledge sharing that can inform policies in areas of relevance for emerging market and middle-income countries. It also aims at deepening dialogue and outreach with member countries, regional institutions, and other stakeholders in the region, the IMF said in a press release.

    "The IMF is grateful to the People's Republic of China for its financial contributions to the IMF Shanghai Center and its facility," read the press release.

    The operation of the IMF Shanghai Center marks a strategic advance in the fund's Asia-Pacific role, providing a permanent regional platform to shape policy dialogue, drive research, and affirm its status as a global financial anchor, Wang Peng, an associate researcher at the Beijing Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Monday.

    For Asia-Pacific economies, the center offers timely support for evidence-based policy formation through complex transitions, while fostering trade and stability cooperation to strengthen regional resilience, Wang said.

    I take back everything I said about China having any slight chance of abandoning neoliberalism.

    This is further integration of IMF with the PBOC. What’s the worst that can happen, you ask? Look at Russia’s central bank. I already raised my suspicion a couple years ago that the libs already made a comeback after the 20th CPC Congress and it’s looking more and more likely that my instinct was right back then.

    Do not be surprised if you see a new type of “internationalized offshore RMB” that some will say is “China’s de-dollarization”, when the currency is probably designed and guided by the IMF itself.

  • China is not going to help Iran this time.

    According to Chinese media (article here, use machine translation), when Trump withdrew from JCPOA in 2018, China’s Dalian port provided shelter for the 3.4 million ton Iranian oil under sanction (worth $2 billion). Over six years, the storage has racked up over $450 million in port fee. When Iran’s foreign minister visited China in January 2025, apparently they demanded that China return the sanctioned oil but refused to pay the port fee.

    Chinese nationalist propaganda says that the Chinese leadership is pissed at Iran and did not like to be made a fool of, and China’s apparently decided to go its own way. If Iran doesn’t want to play ball, then China will simply not rely on Iran at all. Apparently China’s leadership is also pissed at the Iranians making a deal with India, but I cannot verify this.

    On the other side, it is also worth noting that in 2021, China and Iran signed a 25-year cooperation program that was supposed to have China investing $400 billion in Iran over 25 years. Yet after nearly 5 years, only a tiny fraction of that investment money ever made it to Iran, apparently because of Iran’s solidarity with Palestine made many Chinese investors wary of a war in the region that could cause them to lose their investment altogether.

    You can imagine what Iran feels about China’s commitment to the deal as well. My impression is that both countries never really took each other seriously, and were only “pushed together” by US geopolitical actions. So it should not surprise you that they’re no longer seeing eye to eye after a few years.

    Meanwhile, according to the “Chinese business circle intelligence network” (lol) that has been floating on the social media in the last few days, many Chinese businessmen in Iran are sounding pessimistic about the situation. Although the protests never reached the scale of the 2023 Amini protest and very likely involved foreign agents, what they’re saying is that unlike the Amini protest, which was mostly ignited by religious/social affairs in nature, this time the protest is very much driven by the cost of living, hence why the protests erupted mostly in the peripheral regions that have been enduring the largest burden of the economic pain.

    Since the 12 day war with Israel last June, rial has significant depreciated (by ~44%) and inflation is now through the roof. Although the IRGC and the Iranian government may well survive this round of protest, the foundation is being shaken to the core because the ruling class can no longer keep the people placated with the spiraling inflation. The problem with the protest movement is that they are not organized or led by a credible leader, so it’s bound to be hijacked by foreign agents.

    Many Chinese businessmen are now frantically looking for exit, while just a year ago they were still fairly optimistic about the situation in Iran. Things really took a drastic turn after the 12-day war and Trump’s bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities.

    Just a few observations from what I’ve seen on the Chinese side of the conflict.

  • Chongqing model - a potentially very different path taken by China if Bo Xilai was not embroiled in the famous scandal (many believe it was persecution by the reformist faction) and gave way to Xi Jinping’s rise, who is more moderate and acceptable by the liberal reformers.

    A cornerstone of Bo's Chongqing model was a series of egalitarian social policies aimed at lessening the gap between rich and poor and easing the rural-urban divide. Bo promoted the notion of pursuing "red GDP"—an economic model embodying communist egalitarianism—and suggested that, if economic development were analogous to 'baking a cake', then the primary task should be to divide the cake fairly rather than building a larger cake.

  • China is going to be fine. The CPC leadership is not stupid, obviously. China has been intensely building up self-sufficiency in the last few years, the strategic petroleum reserves and food stocks are at an all time high, as well as the push for technological breakthroughs and especially in clean renewable energy.

    The problem, as I have said, is internal and ideological in nature.

    I think the biggest surprise for everyone was how China’s domestic consumption has failed to pick up since abandoning Zero Covid in early 2023. I remember even Western financial presses during 2021-2022 were like: “just wait until China opens up its economy, then global demand will soar and we’ll all be making money”.

    We’re now in 2026 and China’s domestic consumption is unlikely to return to the pre-Covid 2019 level anytime soon, and at least not in the next few years (the most optimistic analysis I’ve seen say at least wait until 2030).

    I’ve written a lot about the deflationary economy so won’t be repeating here. Property market is imploding and the local government debt crisis being the major factors, and this translates into a slump in domestic consumption which also means that China is now even more dependent on its export sector (which is also under attack by Trump’s tariffs, and the EU unable to substitute the US as a consumer market since the Ukraine war) as well as making profitable investments overseas (which is being undone by Trump’s B-2 stunt in Iran and the Maduro capture stunt in Venezuela - note that both endeavors required only minimal effort from the US without being dragged into a long war that many predicted).

    And it’s not that the Chinese leadership doesn’t know the importance of domestic market. The Dual Circulation strategy has been implemented since April 2020, it simply did not produce the result even after 5 years. If anything, the opposite has happened where trade surplus is now at a record high while the domestic consumption plunged.

    So China is in a very weird spot right now when it comes to its international relations:

    Militarily, China has been building up its military but still inadequate to protect its overseas investments, as other users have pointed out. This demonstrates an overly optimistic view of the Washington-led international order, which has greatly benefited China’s fast growth in economy but the lagging military expenditure also means China cannot project its power like the USSR did, which I still see as the superior foreign policy compared to China’s win-win cooperation model.

    (NOTE: this is not to say that China cannot put up a fight if it wants to. Warfare is an extension of politics, and with hybrid warfare the goal is to exert enough costs - political, economic and social costs - to force your opponents into backing down and mitigate the damage. So it’s not always black and white, like the only victory can only come from complete neutralization of your enemy)

    Economically, China has amassed great influence all over the world. See that even Argentina, who is now effectively US colony, still continues to trade with China, because nobody can really decouple from China. So, China does indeed have a lot of economic levers if it wants to assert its interests. However, China continues to adhere to neoliberal ideology that makes them very difficult to abandon their export sector, and as a result of needing to run trade surpluses, finds themselves continue to be dependent on the global free market. The failure to build a strong consumer market (which is really the result of over-reliance on export and supply-side investment) also made China unable to absorb global export surpluses and replace the US consumer market. It keeps them in a competitive state with the rest of the exporter economies in the Global South instead.

    Finally, I want to point out that the US is not “invincible” either. The 2022 Ukraine war and the sanctions that ensued caused global energy supply disruption and the high inflation in the US resulted in the Biden administration hiking the interest rates. This placed the US dollar at an unprecedented perilous situation, and with Russia calling for global de-dollarization and many Global South countries looking to abandon the dollar because they started to run into dollar liquidity crises, China’s reluctance to go with it (because China is still too dependent on and benefited greatly from the dollar hegemony) has caused this opportunity to be missed.

    So, it is very important to understand that while the US has given China the room to grow into a global economic superpower, it also tied China to become highly dependent on the US consumer market. China has become addicted to the neoliberal free trade and the dollar hegemony that made them wealthy. Remember that 70% of Belt and Road investments were made in US dollars - this is as clear a signal of the intention behind China’s foreign investment strategy.

    It’s unlikely that China will lose anything substantial, but it makes the relationship with the Global South a very distinct one from the USSR, where the latter was ideologically driven. This is why I said the problem with China is internal and ideological.

  • Some interesting commentary from Beijing moves to cut losses in Venezuela after Maduro’s capture Asia Times:

    China has drawn up plans to minimize losses in Venezuela and fine-tune its broader overseas investment strategy after the United States captured the Latin American country’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, on January 3.

    Since the US military operation in Venezuela, the Chinese government has been busily assessing the situation and calculating potential losses to its economic interests.

    On Wednesday and Thursday, Chinese officials, media and commentators started expressing their views, showing that Beijing has finished its assessment.

    In general, Beijing regrets having put too many eggs in one basket and having been too ready to believe that its investments in Venezuela would face minimal risks under international law. It also admits that it had underestimated the Trump administration’s ambition in the Western Hemisphere.

    Some commentators are saying that, in the short run, China wants to ensure it can continue receiving crude oil from Venezuela, which still owes it about US$10 billion to US$20 billion. In the middle and long term, China may seek to sell certain fixed assets in Venezuela to Western firms or form partnerships with them to limit losses.

    ‘Law of the jungle’

    When the Trump administration said in its National Security Strategy on December 4 that the US would strategically refocus on the Western Hemisphere, many Chinese commentators initially responded with mockery, arguing that the US was no longer wealthy or capable enough to sustain military dominance simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and its own backyard.

    That assessment has since shifted sharply, with commentators now acknowledging that Maduro’s capture has had a significant negative impact on Chinese investments in Venezuela and across Latin America.

    A Beijing-based columnist surnamed Xu says in his article that China’s long-running oil-for-loans arrangements with Venezuela have left Beijing heavily exposed.

    “Since 2007, China has provided Venezuela with US$60 billion in loans. At the end of 2025, more than US$10 billion was still outstanding,” Xu says. “The debt is repaid with crude oil, requiring Venezuela to ship about 610,000 barrels a day to China.”

    Xu says that with Maduro’s arrest, China could face substantial losses. He warns that Chinese firms have invested billions of US dollars in Venezuela’s energy sector, including large-scale drilling platforms and upstream oil projects, many of which could be forced to halt, while daily crude oil shipments used for debt repayment could be disrupted.

    Such disruptions, he adds, would force refineries in eastern China to seek alternative supplies, potentially driving up oil prices and fuel costs. Besides, a range of Chinese-invested infrastructure, manufacturing and telecommunications projects in Venezuela would face heightened default risks.

    We already know that China already switched to Canadian crude since last November, right after the Trump-Xi meeting:

    So it’s quite possible that the US gave China some “grace period” to reroute their oil supply before the actual operation in Venezuela. China has also built up a massive amount of strategic petroleum reserves so the oil stock in China should be quite safe for now.

    Obviously it’s still early days and much of this kind of commentary is still speculative, but if the US goal in Venezuela is indeed to replicate what they did in Iran with the bombing of nuclear facilities, which is to scare off Chinese investors, then it’s going to have a broader impact to Latin America as a whole, as it did to the ME/NA region where both Russia and China are pulling away their strategic interests from.

  • Honestly the Chinese model cannot really be replicated anywhere else.

    China has something that the US wants but most countries lack: vast reserve of labor force and a relatively complete logistics chain to produce cheap goods.

    Energy producing countries like Russia, Iran and Venezuela are destined to be opposed by the US. This is why it’s completely nonsense when people say the US can ally with Russia, unless Russia bends the knee like the Saudis. This is because the US won’t allow these oil-producing countries to simply take advantage of their oil revenue to develop their domestic economy.

    Hence the Saudis could only use their vast dollar revenue from selling oil to purchase US weapons and US treasuries instead of investing in their domestic economy. This is what “petrodollar” really meant.

    Another region that has a similar advantage as China is the ASEAN economies (Southeast Asia). However, since the 1980s, Southeast Asia has been Japan’s backyard (Japan invested heavily in SEA together with technology transfer).

    I remind everyone that Thailand’s GDP per capita in 1990 was $1500 USD, while China’s was only $300! They were one of the fastest growing economies at the time.

    Mahathir’s proposed East Asia Economic Caucus would have moved ASEAN closer to Japan while opposed integration with Clinton’s APEC. This, the US cannot allow. Thus the Southeast Asian economy was destroyed during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

    China would replace Southeast Asia’s role as the global manufacturing hub after joining the WTO in 2001. Because the US was behind it.

  • Comrade @FuckyWucky@hexbear.net is correct. The shift from fiscal (Keynesianism) to monetary policy (Monetarism) reflects the paradigm shift with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s. Fiscal is government spending, monetary is central bank controlling interest rate to “influence money supply”.

    What this monetary loosening is really saying is that “look, our household debt level isn’t as high as those of Western countries and Japan, so we need to encourage the people to take on more debt to spur domestic consumption”.

    This is not to say that the Chinese government is not doing fiscal policy, but a lot of those came in the form of subsidies to promote trade-ins of automobiles and electrical appliances. As I have been saying, the real fiscal spending should spent on creating job guarantee, ensure social safety net, and directly raise the income of the rural/migrant worker population.

    The key number to watch is deficit spending from the government (currently ~4% of GDP), which reflects actual fiscal spending from the government that has not been taxed back.

    For comparison, the US has been running 6-7% deficit for the past two years. The problem with the US is that most of that money did not reach the working class people, but it does not change the fact that the US government (as do any country that has monetary sovereignty) has the power to create new money out of thin air. The most recent example was the Covid stimulus, where each person in the US received a lump sum $2000 in cash, while still far from adequate, still prevented the US (and the world) from going into recession during the pandemic.

    The easiest way to think about the difference between “state created money” (deposits created from central government deficit spending) and “commercial lending” (deposits created from commercial bank loans) is that the former is the money that can circulate permanently in the economy (until or unless they are taxed back by the government, otherwise they cannot go anywhere), while the latter drives up money supply but it has to be paid back at some point in the future (with interests), so there is no net financial asset creation (you cannot “save” those money).

    When the private sector debt is high, the only way to offset this is for the government to create new money (run the deficit itself) so the private sector has access to new source of permanent money that they can use to service their debt. If not, the private sector (and local governments) will have to rely on borrowing from commercial banks to access new money, and when their debt bubble gets too large, the economy slows down, which is exactly what is happening in China today.

  • The handsome Chinese soldiers… even though they’re fighting us and we’re supposed to be enemies, I like that they’re all brave and patriotic. Very professional. I wish our soldiers are more like that!

  • electoralism @hexbear.net

    Zohran Mamdani Wins New York With a Youthquake

    www.nakedcapitalism.com /2025/11/zohran-mamdani-youthquake-new-york-cuomo-trump-democrats.html
  • Chapotraphouse @hexbear.net

    Ridiculous Chinese censorship used AI to change the gay couple in Together (2025) to a heterosexual couple

  • History @hexbear.net

    Average working hours dropped drastically after 1917, due to fear that the Russian Revolution would inspire similar revolutions in other countries