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xiaohongshu [none/use name]

@ xiaohongshu @hexbear.net

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  • Thank you for raising these very important questions, because as a Marxist and socialist, these are the issues most close to heart for me rather than the amazing technological breakthroughs in China. I have many on the table, for example, class division, rural/urban divide, healthcare system, etc. that I simply haven’t found the time to write amidst a very busy work schedule.

    As a starter, it is important to understand why the Chinese economy is in the state it is currently. Whenever you hear someone argues why China should/shouldn’t have billionaires with all the rhetoric without telling you anything about the history of its economic development, especially the watershed moment of the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform, then you know they don’t know what they’re talking about. My favorite one is “China keeps billionaires under their control” lol - if that’s the case, then why would you need billionaires in the first place?

    The simple answer is that the decentralized nature of the economy forced the local governments to seek financial support from the rich business elites, who then formed cliques with the government officials and became billionaires in the process. It is a product of the system itself. Read my post here about the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform and its consequences. It explains a lot about why there are billionaires and why the property market booming is such a big deal in China’s recent history.

    For class division, I recently came across a lecture from Prof. Wang Ou and while I was writing up the notes, I realized that someone else has already done a professional translation of the full lecture. I strongly recommend you read this article: Wang Ou: Migrant workers, after the honeymoon which is essentially the entire transcript of the lecture translated into English.

    Prof. Wang’s research is mostly focused on women migrant workers and the challenges they face after getting married and having kids, but even taking such a glimpse into a slice of the migrant worker’s lives will tell you a lot about class division in China.

    I wrote a bit about this in another comment the other day in response to someone else in a different topic, I am reproducing my comment here to add on to what is in the article above:

    In China, your hukou (i.e. where you are born, or rather, the residence of your parents) determines your access to housing, education, healthcare, pension/insurance and public utilities in the urban areas. There are ~40% of people with rural hukou registration that are effectively barred from what urban citizens get to enjoy - not completely, but it’s extremely limited.

    Currently, there are 300 million migrant workers (农民工) in China (40% of the 700+ million total labor force, and nearly the entire population of the US!) who work in the cities but their rural hukou registration limits their access to housing (and education for their kids - both are connected, see below).

    Migrant workers are the true underclass that makes your cheap iPhones and build all those amazing infrastructure across China, yet because of their rural hukou registration, are not entitled to public utilities in the cities they work in, because technically they are not residents of the cities they work in. Your home is tied to the village/provincial town you came from. This allows the municipal governments to exploit their labor while providing minimal services in return. (Remember, there is no personal income tax in China (only 70 million people have to pay income tax), the most important tax revenue is value-added tax, so the more labor hours being squeezed out of the workers, the higher tax revenues the local governments receive).

    Similarly, employers are not obligated to contribute to pension funds and insurances (五险一金) so migrant workers usually get screwed the worst because they have little to no safety net if they get sick or become unemployed.

    It is class division based on where you’re born.

    Now, on to housing, more than 60% of them live in rental units, 20% live in company-provided hostels/dormitories (shared living spaces) and a proportion of them (20%) did purchase houses (especially with marriage and kids) but mostly in the provincial towns. A lot of them were scammed into purchasing houses because the local governments, in an attempt to drive up land prices, tied education resources to housing, and effectively coercing these migrant working class families to purchase a house in the county in order to even have a chance of sending their kids to public schools due to the points-based system that prioritizes home ownership:

    According to Prof. Wang Ou’s research (see my linked article above):

    So, how much does it cost for a migrant worker to buy a home in the county? While staying in newly purchased apartments of migrant workers, I calculated the expenses carefully. In a county in southern Jiangxi, homes cost 6,000–7,000 RMB [$852-994] per square meter; in a county in western Guangxi, 4,000–5,000 RMB [$568-710]. A 100-square-meter shell apartment plus full fit-out costs at least 600,000–700,000 RMB [$85,215-99,418]. This is an enormous burden—often draining the savings of two generations and still requiring loans for ten or twenty years.

    Education is very important in China (and East Asian culture) as it is essentially the path towards upward social mobility. Many parents who want their kids to even have a chance to get enrolled in public schools were coerced into purchasing a house, because of the point-based system. If they are not wealthy enough to own a house, their kids will not be eligible for public schools (simply not enough places for everyone) even though they are born and raised in the city where their parents have worked for years. In this case, they will have to resort to private schools, which are more expensive and draining on the parents’ expenses. That’s how the system favors the wealthy.

    As a result, the parents will often seek the financial support from their parents (the kids’ grandparents) and use their life savings as downpayment for houses, work hard themselves while saving very little to pay the mortgages for 10-20 years, all in the hopes that their kids will have access to good schools.

    So, the purchasing of one house is not just about one family, it’s about three generations of people. The plunging property prices in China is now taking its toll on the Chinese households across multiple generations. This is how you get low domestic consumption.

    I wish I have more time to write about these in more detail because they are very important and interesting topics to discuss. I hope this is enough to serve as primers for you into navigating these topics.

  • Just a minor correction, the recent development of IMF Shanghai Center isn’t sudden welcoming, and IMF has been in China for a long time, but the further integration of the Chinese monetary system into the IMF framework, with the IMF now recognizing China’s role as an economic powerhouse in the region and in the world.

    China will continue to play a major role in the global economy in the years to come, but I don’t see them abandoning the IMF neoliberal framework anytime soon.

  • I just responded lol. Don’t really agree with the author’s take.

  • I think the author is trying to project China into becoming a new USSR, which China is not and will not. To be fair, I also pinned my hopes on China stepping up when the Ukraine war started, but over the years, it’s clear that this is not going to be the case.

    So, in this sense, China is not waiting nor is it losing. In fact, I think China’s been playing its cards very competently against Trump’s trade war aggressions. There is only disappointment if one thinks this will lead to a new global order that will benefit the Global South. The opposite is happening, with China dumping its surplus industrial goods on the other countries, especially the EU, forcing them into running worsening trade deficits to protect China’s own domestic export industries.

    In other words, China is exporting unemployment in a world where there is a surplus of productive capacity while the global demand for consumption is dwindling.

    Furthermore, China standing up against the US would mean their trillions and trillions of accumulated US dollars would be turned worthless. Despite frantic purchase of gold, it still only constitutes a tiny fraction of China’s vast foreign reserves. The ruling class and the bourgeois elites would not want to see their wealth evaporates, so even the most revolutionary leaders would still have to confront heavy obstacles when trying to touch the elites’ interests.

    This may seem like a contradiction but it is by design - the US de-industrializes itself and runs a perpetual trade deficit, while you get all the benefits of industrialization and GDP, yet you will find yourself entrenched so deeply into the system we designed that getting out of the rut becomes increasingly difficult by the day.

    The only way out, as I have always pointed out, is for China to abandon the neoliberal ideology, a system that it has greatly benefited from for at least 30 years. And to be clear, China isn’t the only one playing this game. Before that, South Korea and Taiwan were the winners who took advantage of the early GATT (now known as WTO) arrangements to benefit from running trade surplus, and before them, Japan in the 1960s (under the Bretton Woods era).

    Everyone is playing this neoliberal game, hoping that they too, can one day be a winner like China, South Korea, Japan etc. This is why Trump’s global tariffs, while seem like nightmares for some, also presented (the illusion of) opportunities for others. Everyone is secretly hoping that Trump would break up an entrenched system where upward mobility has now become stifled for most low/middle income developing countries, that somehow, with the ongoing US-China trade war, they could exploit the opening to become the next rising exporter country. Meanwhile, China’s maneuvers are all about preventing exactly that from happening, so the US will continue to rely on China.

    That’s the true logic behind Trump’s trade war. It keeps the Global South disorganized and in competition with one another, while the US reaps and extracts from their bickering. Behind this is the “promise” of a collapsing order and where one can climb that ladder under chaos, only to fall into the designs of the imperialists. Laugh at the European vassals all you want, but at least they have class solidarity and understand well enough some of them will have to sacrifice themselves to preserve the system for the bourgeoisie to keep the treats flowing, like worker drones sacrificing for the queen to protect the colony under distress.

    TL;DR: The fall of the USSR and its consequences. There is no international solidarity anymore.

  • Unfortunately Vietnam’s position is quite precarious right now. I wrote about China’s Hainan Island strategy which if successful, will deal a blow to Vietnam’s (and the entire Southeast Asia’s) economy

    China is already pre-empting this by turning Hainan Island into a Free Trade Port since mid-December, which by the way, is officially fully open to the world (you can access Youtube and the entire Western internet from Hainan Island without restriction now).

    If China plays the card right, then Vietnam will be locked into low end manufacturing while China kills any chance of Vietnam transitioning into high end manufacturing sector.

    Under the tariffs and the ongoing US-China dispute has positioned Southeast Asian exporter countries such as Vietnam to benefit from the current development, as foreign companies attempt to relocate their production sites from China to Vietnam.

    And what is Vietnam’s advantage here? The world-class entrepot of Singapore that is conveniently situated in the East-West sea-based trade route. Vessels have to pass through the Malacca Straits to load and unload their cargoes in Singapore, and Vietnam being part of the ASEAN community takes advantage of Singapore as part of their supply chain network to integrate into the global market.

    Now, the Hainan Island being converted into a Free Trade Port is about to upset this balance completely, if China’s strategy succeeds.

    Read the link of China’s readout of the link above - the key clause is that goods entering Hainan and achieving 30% added value will be able to enter Mainland China duty-free. In other words, Hainan Island will simultaneously function as a key logistics hub that threatens to replace the role of Singapore, and more importantly, foreign companies that add 30% value to their products within Hainan Island will now enjoy tariff-free entry into China.

    Look at Hainan Island’s geographical location in relation to Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Singapore) - pay attention to its proximity to Vietnam:

    If Hainan Island can be developed into an industrialized region, do you think foreign investments, especially high tech sector, will still find Vietnam attractive?

    First of all, Singapore has 17% corporate income tax. Hainan Island’s going to be 15%. So Singapore is going to lose its comparative advantage there.

    Second, Hainan Island will effectively function as a portal for foreign corporations into China that will enjoy virtually very low tariff and tax for their goods (complementing Hong Kong’s role as China’s offshore financial powerhouse).

    Third, just behind Hainan is the backing of the world’s most powerful industrial economy complete with world-class logistics and supply chain.

    If China’s Hainan strategy succeeds, Vietnam will be locked into low end manufacturing for it cannot offer cost advantage for the high tech sectors with Hainan just next to them.

    Now, there’s a caveat: which is that Hainan is still comparatively underdeveloped compared to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, but the potential for growth is strong if China invests heavily into the region.

    And most importantly, by supplanting Singapore and Southeast Asia as a chokehold against itself, China gains geostrategic advantage against the US blockade strategy and ensures its dominance in global trade on the supply side of the equation (i.e. Chinese export industries get to remain competitive).

    Finally, just to reiterate: there is no contradiction at all with what I’ve been saying. China’s problem is internal and ideological - that its neoliberal policy cannot sustain a healthy growth of domestic consumption due to growing wealth inequality, hence its prioritization on global trade-based strategy, which in turn, serves as a positive feedback loop that makes China become even more reliant on global trade than ever. And when you have over-capacity, you have no choice but to kill your competitors’ trade through mercantilism because there isn’t enough demand in the world to keep all of the workers employed.

    The opposite strategy, which is what I propose, will take advantage of China’s huge consumer market to absorb the global export surplus goods (including those from Vietnam) and alleviate much of the regional tension, allowing those countries to successfully transition into higher end manufacturing eventually. This will require wealth redistribution and abandoning of neoliberal policies to raise the income of the Chinese working class. Otherwise, China will have to choose protecting its own export industries and destroy that of its neighbors.

    China’s response to foreign corporations shifting their production to Vietnam is to make Vietnam (and the entire SEA) irrelevant, and there’s nothing they can do about it. Brutal yet surprisingly simple solution - if the strategy succeeds (I have to qualify this here because it’s going to take some years and China can very much screw up here).

    On the other hand, Vietnam having joined CPTPP and having to commit to labor rights reform to meet the ILO standards have paradoxically resulted in gains in labor rights for the Vietnamese workers in recent years. I will write about this if I have time later this week but it’s an interesting and positive development.

    Overall I see Vietnam as being caught in a difficult situation and is positioning itself to align with the US, unless China somehow manages to resolve its low domestic consumption issue.

  • Regarding the figure of “another 10,000 km scheduled,” I was wondering whether this comes from an official planning document or a specific announcement. I’ve seen different estimates depending on which planning cycle or projection is referenced, so I wasn’t sure which source this number was based on.

    It is based on the recent announcement for HSR development under 15th Five Year Plan.

    On profitability, I completely agree that only a very small portion of the HSR network makes money in pure operating terms. I was just unsure about the estimate of “~2300 km,” since most public discussions I’ve come across tend to refer to the number of profitable lines rather than total track mileage. If there’s a specific source behind this figure, I’d appreciate learning more.

    There are only 6 HSR lines that are making profit:

    1. Beijing-Shanghai line (aka Jinghu line, 京沪高铁)
    2. Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong XRL (广深港高铁)
    3. Shanghai–Nanjing intercity line (沪宁城际铁路)
    4. Beijing–Tianjin intercity line (京津高铁)
    5. Nanjing–Hangzhou line (宁杭高铁)
    6. Shanghai-Hangzhou line (沪杭高铁)

    They all add to ~2300km.

    At the same time, I was also wondering (at least on the mainland) whether operational profitability is considered a major issue when weighed against the broader contextual benefits of HSR, such as national connectivity, regional integration, productivity gains, time savings, industrial coordination, and long-term development effects. My understanding was that these wider benefits are often treated as part of the rationale, even when individual lines are not profitable on paper.

    Correct. Most public transits are not expected to be profitable, which is why many public transit companies also double as REITs to take advantage of the real estate prices as transit infrastructures are built. The most prominent example right now is Shenzhen Metro that has transfused billions to save the property developer giant Vanke from sinking.

    Additionally, many railway companies are being restructured into joint-stock companies to securitize their railway assets as asset-backed securities, in other words, financialization of the public infrastructure to make money. You can read the article from People’s Daily here.

    Concerning the central versus local investment shares after the 2019 restructuring, the overall trend you describe seems very reasonable. I was only unsure whether the precise percentages mentioned (such as 9–15%) are published as national statistics, or whether they are drawn from individual project disclosures. If you have documentation or examples, I’d be grateful to read them.

    The numbers came from the link I posted in the comment above.

    Lastly, on the relationship between HSR construction and the real-estate downturn, I agree that the two are clearly connected. I was just hoping to better understand how much of today’s local-debt pressure is directly tied to rail investment itself, versus broader fiscal issues and the wider property-sector slowdown.

    This is a very long story that you can read from my previous effort post here, which really started with the 1994 Tax Sharing Reform. Long story short is that the new tax sharing arrangements prompted local governments to seek non-tax revenues to finance their own budget, and the result was unleashing of the property market, starting from Zhu Rongji’s policy in 1998, accelerated under the 4 trillion yuan stimulus drive in 2007, and the final bang with the 2015 Monetization of Shantytown Redevelopment policy (棚改政策).

    Public transits are great ways to stimulate regional and satellite cities growth, and a lot of investment were poured into building new stations to connect the provincial towns and building new cities/residential areas. Some of the areas genuinely benefited from the infrastructure growth, but many others were recklessly built with the local governments competing with one another to boost their GDP numbers and made great career promotions along the way.

    The problem now is that there is an oversupply in housing, and with the property prices plunging, the local governments are losing their land premium revenue while having to service a mounting amount of debt taken out for these infrastructure building.

    Related to that, I also wanted to ask whether the current local government debt “crisis” is truly as severe as it is often portrayed, or whether some of the discussion may be overstated, especially considering the structure of the debt, the role of state ownership, and the central government’s capacity to restructure or absorb risks if necessary.

    Nobody actually knows the true scale of the debt, since much of the debt taken out before 2015 were from shadow banks (LGFVs) and were off the books (at least opaque to the public).

    What we do know is that the November 2024 policy to help service the debt (化债 but not sure the exact term in English) was a 12 trillion yuan solution, which

    1. Raised the debt ceiling of the local governments by 6 trillion yuan to borrow new money at lower interest rates to pay off the outstanding high interest rate debt
    2. Allowed the local governments to raise 4 trillion yuan of municipal bonds to service the outstanding debt
    3. At least 2 trillion yuan will be paid per the contracts

    This was the last “big policy” being instituted by the central government to help with the local government debt servicing. The exact amount is almost certainly to be much larger than 12 trillion yuan, probably a few times that, since many local governments are still reporting financial distress at the moment.

  • Before 2019, when China State Railway Ltd. was still known as the China Railway Corporation (before it was restructured into a joint-stock company), state investment typically remained above 50% of the projects.

    From 2019-2020, with the restructured China Railway, the burden is shifted to the local governments, such as the recent Eight Horizontal and Eight Vertical Networks (八纵八横), state investment has fallen to ~20-30%.

    Since 2021, state investment accounts for 15% or less of the total investment, with the local governments shouldering the most. For example, the Nantong-Suzhou-Jiaxing-Ningbo line received 15% state funding, while Shaoyang-Yongzhou line received only 9%.

    The only recent project that receives significant state funding is the Sichuan-Tibetan railway where it is 100% invested by China State Railway.

    You can read more about it here

  • I think what you were referring to was the subway/metro projects.

    Believe it or not, there are still another 10000km of HSR that is scheduled to be built, on top of China’s already impressive 50000km of HSRs (70% of all the world’s high speed rails)!

    How many of that will eventually be built isn’t clear, and only time will tell.

    The HSRs were supposed to drive up the land value by stimulating development of new and nearby cities, which local governments rely on to finance their expenses. As only ~2300km of the 50000km HSRs are actually making profit, HSR development is tightly connected to the real estate prices, which have been plunging since 2021, and the local governments that have taken out huge debt for their development (especially after 2015) are now in deep trouble with the debt bubble.

    China has been trying to build HSRs overseas but the premier project, Indonesia’s Jakarta-Bandung HSR, is running into profitability issue currently as the number of passengers is below expectation while operational costs continue to mount.

  • MAD has very limited range compared to sonar. The biggest problem is still the search space - most people have little idea how vast the sea/ocean is, even for coastlines. You have to have very extensive coverage in order to find that needle in the haystack. There simply aren’t enough air assets to provide that sort of coverage, unless you have additional intel that narrows down your search perimeter.

    There have been advances in synthetic aperture radar (SAR) where AI accelerated signal processing can help, but we are still very far from the deployment of these systems in the real world.

    A lot of what you’re seeing these days are merely academic papers that are cool ideas but as with everything being translated into real world usage, a lot of them will run into practical issues that render them less effective than were initially thought.

  • Diesel subs are extremely quiet when they are moving very slowly but they are built for littoral (coastal) defense and have limited range.

    The way you sneak a sub right beside a carrier battle group is to ambush them by going very slow and attempting to intercept the projected navigation path of the fleet before they even arrive, and then wait with patience.

    To avert this one of the primary tactics of fleets is to stick to shallower waters forcing the subs to riskier depths where they're more easily tracked.

    Believe it or not, shallow waters is where submarines are the hardest to detect. Active sonar gets very noisy return from shallow seafloor which easily masks the presence of a sub, besides the fact that you don’t want to be blasting active sonar around coastal areas with civilian fishing/shipping activities anyway.

    The shallow seabed also reflects way too much noise (and again especially with civilian fishing/shipping activities nearby) for passive sonar to pick up the presence of a quietly waiting sub. Not saying it’s impossible, but it’s substantially more challenging than in deeper waters.

    In deeper waters, and depending on the regional characteristics, you have what’s called thermal layers, which is an interface at which water temperature rapidly changes, and allowing sound to bounce off the layer interface instead of penetrating through one. Thus you have two layers of sound propagation and if a sub is hiding below the thermal layer, they have a good chance of avoiding detection from the surface fleet’s sonars above the layer.

    However you still have to be careful with the full ASW capabilities of a carrier battle group, which will have attack subs and sonobuoys dropped from ASW planes scanning below the layer.

    Diesel subs are not capable of such blue water operations. Their biggest asset is their stealth when moving very slowly, and is best when positioned for ambushing fleets at coastal defense.

    The hard part about anti-submarine warfare is the vastness of the ocean/sea to scan for their presence - it’s like finding a needle in a haystack. But once a submarine is exposed, it’s very difficult to lose track of them again as the search space is narrowed substantially and they cannot really run away at high speed without making significant noise themselves.

  • People love disparaging China about their foreign policy, but this key mutual recognition helped fully develop relations with ASEAN later on, while helping stabilizing ethnic relations back at home (and directly benefiting Chinese people in SEA!). No communist here is ever calling for increased Chinese intervention, which will be incredibly self-destructive.

    The ruling classes in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, all recognise the enormous task of uniting multi-ethnic societies plagued by centuries of colonialism. They do not want a repeat of neo-colonial dynamics that had lead to the fall of countries like Burma, Lebanon, Syria, South Africa, Nigeria, among others. Sectarianism, settler-colonialism, and ethnic/racial chauvinism in the Global South enables the continuous looting and pillaging through accumulation.

    Not sure how this argument stands when the 1998 Indonesian race riots following the Asian Financial Crisis specifically targeted ethnic Chinese in the country.

    And let’s not forget that Malaysian leaders (e.g. UMNO) would periodically raise the 513 incident (race riot against ethnic Chinese in Malaysia) over the years to scare their electorates into voting for the Malay supremacist factions.

    The inter-ethnic situation in SEA is nowhere near as congenial as portrayed here. After all, PAS (Islamic fundamentalists) continues to command strong political influence in Malaysia and the inter-religious and inter-ethnic tensions are far from being settled.

    Don’t have the time to find the specifics so I’m just going to copy and paste the wiki paragraph here (from the link above) which is revealing about China’s foreign policy during the 1998 Indonesian race riots:

    China's cautious response to the issue caused an uproar among human rights groups. Following protests at the Indonesian embassy in Beijing in August, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan made a direct appeal to the Indonesian government to ensure the protection of Chinese Indonesian communities.[67] During a visit to Jakarta in November, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin said that "Chinese Indonesians will not only serve ... the long term stability of Indonesia, but also ... the smooth development of the relationship of friendly cooperation with neighboring countries."[65] China claims they have also urged airlines to operate three more flights out of Indonesia, which transported some 200 Chinese people away from Jakarta.[68] The riots became known in China as "Black May" (黑色的五月), named after a VCD documentary of the events released by the China Radio and Television Publishing House in October.[69] Compared to China's approach, Taiwan took on a more active role in demanding the trial of those involved in the violence and protection for victims. It threatened to withdraw investments from the country, estimated at US$13 billion in 1998, and block the entry of Indonesian workers, whose population in Taiwan had reached 15,000. Taiwan justified the threats "based on the principles of protecting overseas Chinese and protecting human rights". On 9 August, Minister of Investment Hamzah Haz flew to Taiwan and apologised for the violence while promoting Indonesia as an investment destination. At the same time, a Taiwanese delegation met with Wiranto, who was then the Defence Minister under Habibie, as well as several other government ministers.[65]

  • I think it’s just protectionist policy. Chinese chips are already good enough for most inference tasks so there is no need to purchase foreign chips.

  • China’s fight against corruption is a battle we can’t afford to lose, Xi Jinping warns SCMP

    President tells China’s top anti-graft watchdog that corruption is a ‘stumbling block’ that is hampering the country’s development

    Chinese President Xi Jinping has said there must be no room for corrupt elements to hide as he warned that the problem was a threat to the country’s development.

    On Monday, he told a plenary session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) – China’s top anti-corruption body – that the country had made notable progress last year, but the issue remained a “major struggle”.

    “Corruption is a stumbling block and obstacle to the development of the [Communist] party and the country, and the fight against corruption is a major struggle that we cannot afford to lose,” he said, according to state news agency Xinhua.

    “Currently, the situation in the fight against corruption remains grave and complex … We must maintain a high-pressure stance without wavering, resolutely punishing corruption wherever it exists, eliminating all forms of graft, and leaving no place for corrupt elements to hide.”

    Xi also urged officials to come up with new methods to discover, identify and tackle all types of corruption.

    This year will see a major overhaul of local governments across the country, and Xi said the party “must deploy cadres who are truly loyal, reliable, consistent and responsible”.

  • The official guideline has been clear: for inference use domestic chips, for training buy Nvidia.

    The recent ban is probably lobbying from Huawei/other domestic firms who are worried about competition from Nvidia, but their own aren’t very good for training yet. In other words, classic protectionism.

  • But why would the US do that when they already have military bases and I’m sure Denmark will just yield to US demand?

  • At this point I almost believe that the so-called Blob deliberately plays up Trump’s buffoonery.

    This was a hard lesson for me during the Trump’s Liberation Day global tariffs in April last year. The baseline tariff was always going to be 10%, and they could have just said that from the beginning, but it would also have invited backlash from the governments all over the world.

    What did they do instead? They played up Trump’s insane tariff charts and after allowing people to spend days making jokes out of it (remember the “Trump tariffing the penguins” joke?), Trump then “walked back” to the pre-determined 10%. The governments across the world sighed a breath of relief, and implicitly accepted the 10% tariff rate because “it could have been worse”.

    I fully believe it the bourgeoisie were not prepared for a Trump presidency back in 2016, and I still think that Trump caught the ruling class completely off-guard. I also believe that during the first US-China trade war back in 2018, they haven’t figured out a concrete strategy yet. But I simply will not believe that in 2025, they still haven’t come up with a way to deal with a Trump II presidency.

    In fact, we can see the outlines of the imperial strategy being implemented through the Biden years as well, from Trump I’s the US-China trade war that ended with a truce, to Biden’s targeted destruction of the European economy through Ukraine, to the now global tariffs under Trump II. That’s not to say their plans always succeed, but they have a lot more cards to play than many anti-imperialists give credit.

  • I have no idea what Trump is doing (and probably nobody does lol) but here’s a thought:

    I think the goal is still to break up the EU. The libs are pushing for war against Russia, but there is a growing sentiment in the form of nationalist parties that want to de-escalate and make peace with Russia. They could start winning elections very soon.

    How do you ensure that the EU/NATO militarize to the end? Well, if the US is imposing a military threat, both the libs and the nationalists will have no choice but to support the increase of the defense spending in their national budgets.

    This will mean further austerity and breaking down the EU economy from within. The US goal, perhaps, is to coax the EU towards full-fledged militarization and further destabilize the region, then picking them off one by one.

  • The simple answer is to wait a few months then you’ll know if this line of thinking is correct or not. Let’s wait…

  • Logistics tasks Izvestiya

    Orientalist Said Gafurov discusses the prospects of a "Trump route" through Armenia and what it means for Russia.

    Russia has expressed concerns about the "Trump Route" project, which aims to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan through Armenian territory. They claim that this project is not simply an economic initiative, but a "geopolitical Trojan horse," as it carries not only economic but also geopolitical risks. It is expected to significantly shift the balance of power in the Transcaucasus in favor of the United States, weakening Russia's traditional role. While a complete elimination of Russian and Turkish influence is unlikely, the project is expected to significantly limit and transform it. The initiative is seen as a tool for redistributing regional influence in favor of the United States.

    This is a truly significant moment, one that could change logistics in the region, and US control over the infrastructure project isn't just business, but a tool of influence. But only on one condition: if it's implemented. And promises are not marriage. Especially in the Caucasus. And especially by Washington.

    This would effectively be a direct and long-term US presence in the Caucasus: a 74% stake and 49 years of rights. However, for now, this isn't a binding agreement, merely a statement of intent, should the funds be found and the appropriate conditions met. The new company could already gain leverage over Armenia's economy, logistics, and, indirectly, politics. But there's no money yet. There are just words.

    The main problem facing Armenia's national economy is its relative isolation from transport, and this is not even a matter of political or military aspects, but simply of its geographic and infrastructural remoteness from oceans and important trade routes.

    Russia has traditionally determined Armenia's main logistical routes, and some are under the impression that the "Trump route," controlled by an American company, is creating a corridor independent of Russia, directly linking Turkey and Azerbaijan.

    But our country's main infrastructure project in the Caucasus is the North-South Transport Corridor, one of the largest in Eurasia. It's a huge "pie that needs to be divided," as it's impossible to digest alone. It includes several key routes connecting Russia with Iran, India, and more broadly with South Asia, the Persian Gulf countries, and Europe.

    So, the "Trump route," if built, is an east-west corridor linking Turkey and Azerbaijan via Armenia. In theory, it could be part of a broader logistics scheme promoted by the West (the Trans-Caspian route, the "Middle Corridor") and an alternative to Russian initiatives, but for now, this is purely theoretical.

    The main route of the North-South Corridor runs from the ports of the Baltics and Northern Europe through Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to ports on the Indian Ocean. This is a strategic project between Russia, Iran, and India, designed to create a transport route independent of the West.

    The key intersection here is Azerbaijan. Both corridors pass through its territory, but head in different directions.

    Azerbaijan is located at the center of the North-South Corridor, making Astara a major transportation hub. The "Trump route," in addition to solving Armenia and Azerbaijan's own transportation problems, automatically links part of their foreign trade to the North-South International Transport Corridor, as the Caucasus states ultimately need access to the Indian Ocean.

    Moreover, despite the apparent competition, there is at least a theoretical possibility of linking them: cargo traveling along the North-South corridor (for example, from India to Europe) could, via Azerbaijan, receive an alternative route to Turkey via the Armenian section of the “Trump route.”

    Of course, this will require an unprecedented level of cooperation between all parties involved (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, the United States, India, Pakistan, and South Asia and Europe in general), which, under current conditions, seems unlikely due to sanctions and political contradictions, but Trump is not eternal, and economic logic will inevitably replace the logic of confrontation.

    Today, apparently, the tension in dividing up the future pie (and these are all long-term prospects) is increasing, but whether it will be the same the day after tomorrow is a big question.

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