LargePenis

I'd say that the most obvious and most defining purely political divide is secularism vs islamism. The sectarian divide is extremely overarching and divisive, it's also ingrained in the overall structure of the democratic process of the country. There's even an unofficial agreement that everyone follows about the distribution of the six major offices between the three main groups in the country. Shias get the prime minister role + interior ministry, Sunnis get the speaker of the parliament role + defence ministry, Kurds get the ceremonial president role + the foreign ministry. Just to present a vague idea about how ingrained sectarianism is, not a single Arab has ever been elected in the Kurdistan Region.

Voting patterns mainly reflect sectarian allegiance first, then some sort of political statement about secularism and islamism. Sunni Iraqis have mostly consistently voted in favor of secularism since 2010, with a majority of Sunnis voting for Shia political leader Ayad Allawi's secular party Wataniya in 2010, then slowly turning towards Halbusi's Sunni-led Taqaddum and PM Sudani's more secular Party recently. Shias on the other hand have a good history with islamism, unlike Sunnis who had their regions ransacked and destroyed by Sunni islamists like Al Qaeda and later ISIS. Being the comfortable majority, and willing to assert that position, Shias have mostly voted for Shia islamist candidates and parties such as Maliki's State of the Law and the various PMU-aligned parties who despite their strong anti-US positions, still maintain the most exclusionary sectarian language in the country. Kurds lean towards secular Kurdish nationalism, with the more conservative KDP dominating Erbil and Duhok, and the more leftist PUK dominating Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah. Kurds are even more discriminatory and isolationist in their selection than Shias and Sunnis. A Shia dude can get a seat in Sunni-majority Anbar, a Sunni dude can get a seat in Basra, but an Arab will never even be allowed to run in Kurdistan, let alone get a seat.

Then comes the secondary questions such as pro-US vs pro-Iran, and economic stuff. The pro-US vs pro-Iran stuff can be 90% predicted by just looking at the secularism vs islamism position. Most secularists that won seats are naturally more pro-US, mainly because Iran is simply the main source of conservatism and islamism in the country. Being pro-Iran automatically means in most cases that a person is an islamist, with small exceptions such as the Kurdish PUK who have historically had great ties with Iran.

National politics are pretty much an extension local politics, as governorates enjoy a pretty high level of autonomy. I have never seen so much local politics penetrating the national level as in Iraq, where you have local coalitions such as Tasmim in Basra, Wasit Ajmal in Wasit and the Arab Coalition in Kirkuk actually make to the national level on an entirely local political program. The chaos basically already starts on a local level, which is why today you have a lower level of development in Shia-majority regions where the decisionmaking is stuck in the limbo of neverending bickering between the numerous similar parties, while Sunni regions are limited to 2-3 parties at most and Kurdish regions have pretty much one dominant party. If we take Sunni local politics for example, we have Anbar that is dominated by only Taqaddum and their allies, and it's rapidly advancing, while a governorate like Saladin struggles due to all the tribal beef + numerous competing parties for influence.

My overall take is that sectarian trends still mostly continue but getting a bit weaker. Secularism vs islamism continues to be the main political question for sure. The chaos of national politics is directly influenced by the chaos of local politics, as too many similar parties bicker about small issues.

The 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections are officially over, and we have the final results. The results are not entirely finalised yet, as the Election Commission go over small irregularities which might add or subtract one or two seats from some parties, but we have a pretty good idea of how it looks. I’ll first present the totals in three different sections to make the tables smaller and more readable. Section one will be Shia-majority parties, then Sunni-majority parties, then Kurdish-majority parties.

Section 1 – Shia-majority parties:

Section 2 – Sunni-majority parties

Section 2 – Kurdish-majority parties

Discussion

Government formation?

There are a few possible scenarios. The most likely scenario is that we get a vast coalition of literally everyone, with the bigger parties getting the bigger slices of the cake, and smaller parties getting stuff like the Ministry of Tourism. There’s a wild card this time though, Sudani is actually interested in governing instead of bickering like the Sadrists usually do after winning most seats. There are three possible scenarios for coalition governments without the usual “everyone is invited”.

American-friendly government: Sudani (46) + Sunni coalition led by Taqaddum (75) + Kurdish coalition (42) + Tasmim (6) + a few smaller parties (10-20) = >165

Iranian-friendly government: Maliki (28) + PMU coalition (60-ish) + Hakim (18) + Foundation Coalition (7) + PUK (17) + random smaller Shia and Sunni parties (40-ish) = >165

Impact of Sadrist boycott?

This election had a bigger turnout than the last election despite the Sadrist boycott. The Sadrists are now treated as pariahs in Iraq, after their failed attempt to influence the legitimacy of the elections by their stupid boycott. Muqtada Al Sadr has a big hill to climb now if he wants his people to return to politics now. I think that the Sadrists now regret their decision, especially with anti-Sadrists taking most of their seats in the south and Baghdad due to the boycott.

How did our beautiful communists do?

zero, 0, صفر

so sad

Thanks, I feel important on the geometric bear forum

It has never been so dry. The more revolutionary pro-resistance parties self-sabotaged by committing to a more sectarian program, and they lacked the discipline that Hezbollah for example display when dealing with other sects in society. Communists are more committed to a general secular program rather than any revolutionary program, which leads to weird alliances with Adnan Al Zurfi's more pro-US gang that includes even zionist freaks. It's not looking good, but it's a damaged society from the atrocities of Saddam Hussein and later the Americans and ISIS. It will take time.

From my observations, the Iraqi election process is as fair as it gets with the state of democracy across the world. Every nation that tries a fair democratic process is plagued by similar issues when it comes to propaganda by outside actors and widespread media manipulation. The main sources of media manipulation and propaganda when it comes to Iraq are the US and Iran, with both pushing in pretty much opposite directions. The US continuously pushes in the direction of secular liberalism through its media tools, and Iran pushes for more religious Shia nationalism and pro-resistance interests. Things are definitely getting a little less sectarian, as evidenced by the victory of PM Sudani's party in Nineveh, Arabs voting for the Kurdish PUK in Kirkuk because they like the governor, and Sunni-led Taqaddum dominating western Baghdad. I definitely agree with the idea of sectarianism needing to die before divisions across class lines emerge and solidify. The resistance shot themselves in the foot with committing themselves to a more sectarian program, which seems to have alienated a large portion of middle class Shia voters who are annoyed with disruptions to daily life by armed PMU groups and are generally happy with the current progress under PM Sudani. I think that the results in general indicate that a large section of society are moving towards voting for economic interests rather than sectarian interests.

The Iraqi Parliamentary Elections are officially over since a few hours ago. Very civilised and calm occasion, probably the best elections since elections became a thing in Iraq after the American invasion and occupation. Clear increase in the number of voters despite Muqtada Al Sadr's countless tantrums and subsequent boycott of the election, with his 1+ million potential loyal voters not showing up today.

Let's quickly talk results. Final results will be announced tomorrow at 6 PM Baghdad time, but we already have strong indications from exit polls, dumbass election officials who have leaked way too much, and initial calculations by people that I respect in the Iraqi political world. Full breakdown of the results probably coming by the end of the week but no promises. If the names and numbers are confusing, please click on my profile and check my earlier breakdown of the elections.

Biggest winners:

PM Mohammed Al Sudani and his coalition. Sudani's gang have by all indications achieved a historical performance in this election. They seem to have a very strong performance in Baghdad, Basra and surprisingly Nineveh as well. They are set to have 50+ seats at the moment and Sudani looks to be the guy that will be tasked to form the new government. More on this point after the official results, but Sudani's victory comes as a result of a Sunni-Shia middle-class coalition of people that we as Internet freaks would refer to as "I just wanna grill" people. The rise of the griller is a new phenomenon in Iraq, it will be very interesting to talk more about this soon.
Kurdistani Democratic Party. All that talk about Kurds finally getting tired of the Barzani eternal oligarchy was just talk. The KDP has burst through the 1 million votes barrier and will position themselves as the primary senior partner in Sudani's upcoming ruling coalitions, alongside Halbusi's Sunni-led Taqaddum
Nouri Al Maliki's State of the Law. The shit that just won't flush. He is the living proof of "time heals everything". Most Iraqis wanted him hung in Tahrir Square after the ISIS disaster, but somehow people forget and he seems to have secured more seats than last time, enough to make him a pain in the ass when it's time to form a government.

Biggest losers:

PMU-aligned parties except Sadiqoun. Horrible performance by both Kataeb Hezbollah's Huquq, and Badr, two of the three big PMU-related parties. Anti-resistance propaganda by American-backed media has definitely left an effect in people's mind which directly affects their vote and leads to the creation of something like the "I just wanna grill" societal class. PMU parties in Iraq also seem uniquely bad at developing a strong base of loyalty and support, which leads to many situations where they display clear incompetence compared to the disciplined and popular Hezbollah and Ansarallah.
Muqtada Al Sadr. He lost the elections despite his boycott. He wanted to tank the credibility and the participation rate in the elections, but that drastically failed today with how positive the whole atmosphere around the elections has been. He's truly the worst gambler of the all time, can't believe he once again maneuvered himself and his followers into a stupid ass position that makes him look like a loser cult leader again.
Kurdish opposition. It was a little bit of a now or never for most Kurdish opposition parties, but early results shows that they're sadly cooked like the kids would say. Iraqi Kurds just seem incapable of even considering the idea of voting for another guy or party.

The real nerd breakdown coming soon inshallah chat.

It's mostly that, they often deliberately station army and police away from their home regions in order to induce a little more interaction between the different parts of society. Many IDPs will also be tasked with guarding election sites on Tuesday, so it makes sense to give them a chance to vote early.

Iraqi elections have started today. Members of the army, police, other security organs and also internally displaced refugees are voting today and tomorrow. The actual election day will be on Tuesday. I'll keep you nerds updates with the latest exit polls and general info as it comes up in the upcoming week.

Cock Cheney is getting dragged in Jahannam now hopefully

That's the guy. What an insane character, but all his contradictions have left an overall positive effect on Christian visibility in the country. I mostly don't agree with him and he's definitely more of a mafia leader than an actual politician, but I respect the pure grind mentality in getting a pretty oversized chair at the table of power in Iraq. Chaldeans are a minority within a minority, but he's up there with the big boys, being involved even more than most Sunnis and Kurds in making the big decisions in the country.

::: spoiler Section 3 - Questions and Discussion

Where are the Sadrists?

I have written about the Sadrists multiple time here, and their story gets weirder and weirder. The best way to understand them is not seeing them as a political movement, but more as a cult in the image of Muqtada Al Sadr and his father Mohammed Sadiq Al Sadr. They haven’t been really interested in actually exercising political power, and when they have done it, they haven’t been good at it. Sadrist governors have ruled in places like Maysan and Dhi Qar before, and the results have been extremely subpar. It’s not easy to effectively govern when a governor is actively waiting for guidance from his spiritual leader Muqtada Al Sadr. Sadrists were the largest bloc in both the 2018 and the 2021 elections, but they failed to leverage that into a serious coalition, nor a major part of the governments that were formed after the elections. In 2021, Al Sadr failed to achieve a ruling coalition, which led to a deadlock that ended with Sadrists storming the Iraqi Parliament, occupying it for months, and in the end getting into firefights with police and military forces and losing. They nearly dragged the country into a civil war if it weren’t for the rumoured intervention of both the US and Iran that calmed everything down in the end. My analysis is that the humiliation in August 2022 made Sadr realise that his movement can’t do effective political work, and that a withdrawal would be less humiliating than getting outmanoeuvred for a 3rd election in a row. All that talk about talk about the country’s political system being corrupt and distrust in democratic institutions is partly true, but it’s mostly cover for the Sadrists’ lack of political instincts and failure to effectively establish themselves as a serious political force, as opposed to their current image of a volatile outsider political movement that waits for Al Sadr to receive some kind of divine guidance before making a decision. I personally like the Sadrists because they’re simple poor people that have been fucked over by the country’s volatility, but their inability to commit to a project is infuriating.

PMU status and US involvement

As Iraq heads into the parliamentary elections, the fight over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) Authority Bill is a major issue. This law aims to better tie the Shia militias that fought ISIS into Iraq's official security forces. But it was pulled back in late August after strong pushback from the U.S. and splits inside Iraq's parliament, leaving it on hold for now. The bill passed a key review in July and would give the PMU more independence, steady pay, and a lasting spot under the Popular Mobilization Commission, rewarding their key role against ISIS from 2014 to 2017. Still, the U.S. and others say it would boost Iran's control through these groups and hurt Iraq's own power, leading to threats of sanctions and tough talks that slowed everything down especially with bigger U.S.-Iraq fights over disarming militias, which Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani ties to a full U.S. troop pullout by late 2026. This delay could widen rifts in the Shia Coordination Framework that facilitated the government formation in 2021, upset Sunni and Kurdish groups who fear PMU meddling in places like Nineveh, and make after-election deals even harder, which might spark protests like those in 2021, while blocking it could lead to attacks from militias guarding their cut of oil deals and building projects. From a Hexbear perspective, the idea of the PMU should be a positive one as a force that counters US influence in the country. But sadly, the PMU is not as disciplined as Hezbollah in Lebanon, nor have the power base that Ansarallah have in Yemen and are the main drivers of religious fundamentalism in the country. Mark Savaya, a Michigan-based cannabis entrepreneur and prominent donor to Trump's campaigns, was appointed as the U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq just last month. Savaya has already signaled a hardline stance against non-state armed groups like the PMU, warning that Iraq's sovereignty hangs in the balance without their full integration into official forces, which could intensify U.S. diplomatic pressure on Baghdad to kill the stalled Authority Bill. His efforts to "dilute Iranian influence" through talks with Iraqi leaders like Prime Minister Al Sudani might sway Shia factions toward concessions on militia disarmament, potentially averting a post-election backlash but risking unrest if perceived as meddling in Iraq's internal power-sharing dynamics.

Government formation?

With projected seats of around 50 for Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani's Reconstruction and Development Alliance, 70+ for Iran-backed PMU-aligned parties, 40-ish for the Sunni Taqaddum led by Mohammed Al Halbusi, 15 for the rival Sunni Azem, and 30 for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), forming Iraq's next government would likely hinge on a broad Shia-Kurdish-Sunni coalition to clear the 165-seat majority threshold for key votes, as no single bloc dominates in this fragmented 329-seat parliament. Sudani's group and the Shia militias could combine for 120 seats, falling short but providing a strong core, adding the KDP's 30 would push it to 150, leaving room to integrate Taqaddum's 40 for a comfortable 190-seat majority that balances ethno-sectarian quotas as usual. A Shia for prime minister (likely Sudani again), Kurd for president (It will probably be the KDP’s turn this time, as the PUK have too much internal issues), and Sunni for parliament speaker (Taqaddum's edge over Azem giving Halbousi leverage). However, this setup risks prolonged haggling, potentially 200+ days as in past elections, over cabinet shares and veto powers, with Shia demands for PMU entrenchment clashing against Sunni and Kurdish pushback on oil revenues and disputed territories like Kirkuk, while sidelining Azem could spark Sunni infighting or protests. If talks collapse, independents or smaller lists (accounting for the remaining 125-ish seats) might tip the scales toward a looser "unity" government, but that could dilute reforms and invite veto blocs, further entrenching the much-criticised Muhasasa (Ethno-religious) system currently in place.

If you have made it this far, congrats! Also you’re a nerd. No proof reading, you can handle it if I misspell or forget a word.

**Section 2 - Sunni Regions**

Summary Sunni regions + Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk: Taqaddum = 25-30 seats, Azem 10-15 seats, Shia parties = 5-10, Kurdish Parties = 10, Minorities + independents + smaller parties = 10-15.

:::

::: spoiler Section 2 - Kurdistan Region + Kirkuk

**Section 2 - Region: Baghdad**

Baghdad summary: Shia Islamists = 40~ seats, Sunnis = 15~ seats, Communists and secularists = 5, Random parties, candidates and minority seats = 11. Total = 71

**Section 2 - Region: Shia South**

Region 2 – Shia South

South summary: Sudani's party 15-20, Shia Islamists of all flavours = 80 seats, independents + minorities + secularists + smaller parties = 25

Complete breakdown of the 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections

Bismillah

We mustn’t forget that this place started as an offshoot of a certain subreddit that was named r/ChapoTrapHouse, a place that Islamic explorer Qathib Al Kabir visited in 1441 AH. He wrote this in his memoirs:

I also saw the Chapos. They had come to post and had disembarked upon the front page of Reddit. Never have I seen minds so convinced of their own dialectical perfection. They’re fair, of average stature, they wear neither suits nor ties, and their main source of illumination is their triple monitors. Every man wears a hoodie that covers half his dignity, so that one arm may clutch a vape.

They carry irony, memes, and citations to Lenin and Wikipedia, and always have them to hand. They wield podcast microphones of formidable make, forged in the fires of struggle sessions. They speak of electoralism with a fervor both mocking and sincere.

Yet I beheld among them a curious contradiction, they sin greatly by committing to electoralism, whispering of “lesser evils” and “harm reduction” as if these were sacraments. When such weakness overcomes them, they hasten to atone. They do this not by prayer, but by posting a certain picture of Lenin, his gaze stern yet forgiving, accompanied by words of repentance and a number of ironic upvotes. Thus their consciences are cleansed, and they return once more to the holy work of posting.

The Travels of Qathib Al Kabir, p.69.

Here we are in 2025, and I’m writing a mega post on the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections that are set to be held on November 11th. Call this a homage to Chapo’s electoral past, but I’m a nerd, you’re all nerds, so let’s just jump into it.

**Section 1 - The Electorial System**

The election is administered by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), an autonomous body established under Article 102 of the Iraqi Constitution. The IHEC handles voter registration, candidate certification, polling logistics, and result tabulation. I’m not sure about this point, but I expect the election to be observed by UN Assistance Mission for Iraq and the European Union. The election for all seats of the national legislature, the Council of Representatives of Iraq (329 seats). The outcome of the election is not just about seats, the Council of Representatives has the responsibility of approving the formation of government (including the Prime Minister), and the President of Iraq will also be elected by Parliament. Every Iraqi citizen aged 18 and over is eligible to vote, even inmates and internally displaced refugees are also fully eligible to vote and will be given the chance to vote on the 9th and 10th before the official election day on the 11th.

The 329 seats are allocated after the population of each governorate. It looks like this for this upcoming election:

The seats for women is a minimum, more women can be elected if they beat the men, but the idea is that women are always at least 25% of Parliament. The minority seats reflect where the minorities mainly live. The three seats for minorities in Nineveh for example are one for Christians, one for Yazidis and one for Shabaks. When polls close on 11 November 2025, ballot boxes from all polling stations are sealed and transported under supervision to provincial counting centers managed by the Independent High Electoral Commission. Votes are then tallied electronically and manually. Once provincial results are verified, IHEC announces the official seat distribution, often in a televised press conference and via their official website, after which political blocs begin negotiations to form a government.

::: spoiler Section 2 - Breakdown of Parties and Candidates by Region

I initially broke down this by governorate, but it became too cluttered. I know my long ass tables are popular within megathread circles, but you’re getting wide boi tables that will break the thread on mobile instead of many long tables.

I have divided the country into four regions to make it easier for everyone. Region 1 is Baghdad, the mixed capital with a fat number of seats. Region 2 is the Shia-majority South (Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyya, Wasit), because the exact same parties are running in pretty much every governorate here. Region 3 is Sunni Arab-majority governorates (Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh, Saladin), because again it looks kinda similar here, but with a little twist in Diyala and Nineveh, as we have significant Kurdish and Shia minorities in those governorates. Region 4 is Kurdish-majority governorates (Duhok, Erbil, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah), similar parties in all governorates, with an important Arab + Turkmen minority in Kirkuk.

PART TWO FOLLOWS IN COMMENTS

I'm writing my Iraqi elections mega post and I'm already on 3000 words and the thing is like 50% done ffs. There are four massive tables that will break the website for sure, I'm looking forward to that. It's not looking good for the communists, but maybe Allah through the divine intercession of Imam Lenin turns their luck.

Oh you're getting tons of tables, I'm working on the post now and I have around 15 tables so far lmao

LargePenis [he/him]

@ LargePenis @hexbear.net

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LargePenis [he/him]

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