[1] Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza?”, “Shāhid ʿalā al-ʿAṣr_”_ (“A Witness to the Era”), Al Jazeera, 27 February 2025; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/ATM8n.

[2] Netanel Flamer, The Hamas Intelligence War against Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024).

[3] “Occupation bombs resistance observation posts in Gaza as protests continue near the fence,” _Arab4_8, 26 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://shorturl.at/l1BLB ; “After Israeli ‘pledges,’ “rebel youth” halt protests in Gaza,”al-Araby, 28 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://shorturl.at/peOd9 .

[4] Daniel Sobelman, Axis of Resistance Asymmetric Deterrence and Rules of the Game in Contemporary Middle East Conflicts (Albany, SUNY Press, 2025), p. 129; also see: Henriette Chacar and Nidal Al-Mughrabi, “Israeli Strikes Target Hamas in Lebanon and Gaza after Rocket Attack,” Reuters, April 7, 2023

[5] Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza?”, op cit.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Youssef Abu Watfa, “Gaza: Rush for Work Permits,” Al-Araby, 7 October 2021, p. 9; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://www.alaraby.co.uk/sites/default/files/07-10-2021/Economy.pdf

[8] ““Labor” Reveals Details on Issuing Work Permits in the Occupied Territories,” 6 October 2021, Felesteen News; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/VZGGR.

[9] Raed Musa, “After a year marked by suffering and crises… Here are the expectations of Gaza’s residents for 2022,” Al Jazeera, 1 January 2022; retrieved online (20 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/hXkyG.

[10] “Israel Considers Easing Restrictions on Gaza,” Al-Ghad News, 2 October 2023; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/JrDTa.

[11] Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza?”, op cit.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] For more on these early cells formed by the Palestinian Islamic movement, see: Mujamma Haraket, “The History Behind Hamas’s Intelligence Apparatus and Understanding its Approach to the Abu Shabab Gang and Other Collaborator Networks: On Al-Majd, Al-Mujahidun Al-Filastiniyyun, and Al-Qiwa Al-Tanfîdîyâ,” 27 September 2025; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://mujammaharaket.substack.com/p/the-history-behind-hamass-intelligence.

[15] Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza?”, op cit. For a poetically written and comprehensive review of Hamas’ use of paragliders, see Mohamed Abdou, “Communiqué #3: “And He (Allah) Sent Against Them Swarms of Birds,’” End Times (Substack); retrieved online (29 March 2026):

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid. According to Benjamin Weinthal, “Exclusive: Hamas document reveals devious paraglider terrorism attack plan,” Fox News, 12 August 2024; retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://www.foxnews.com/world/exclusive-hamas-document-reveals-devious-paraglider-terrorism-attack-plan, Fox News was able to consult “A Hamas military plan obtained by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF),” that was “originally in Arabic and translated into English and reviewed by Fox News Digital.” Given the less than credible sources for this report (i.e., Fox News and the occupation’s military), it should be treated incredulously. According to this article, the Hamas article included the following text:

“ This can be done using silent launch positions. Camouflage of military experiments and training. Reducing costs through the dual use as civilian experiments. Opening the possibility of utilizing civilian activity in other sports that can benefit military activities. Gaining benefits from foreign information obtained through civilian activities.

[…]

Vision: Establishing a military and civilian aviation force in service of the liberation project. Problem: The occupation is working to prevent the establishment of this force and is fighting against it with all means. One of the solutions: Expose this pattern and work towards integrating it into society in a way that prevents the enemy from ending it. Create a reality that forces the enemy to accept it in some form.”

[19] Salih al-Arouri quoted in Al-Mayadin, 25 August 2023.

[20] “Israel Halts Gaza Exports at Key Crossing after Explosives Found,” Reuters, September 4, 2023

[21] Rajab al-Madhun, “Factions Lean Toward Heating Up Gaza Borders: Enemy Returns to ‘Suffocation’ Policy,” Al-Akhbar, 7 September 2023

[22] Ahmed Al-Tanani, “The Biography of Tufan al-Rifaaq,” 10 February 2026, Metras.

[23] Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza,” op. cit.

[24] “Israeli Intelligence Failure: Shin Bet Internal Investigation Summary (7 October 2023).” DocumentCloud; retrieved online (20 March 2026): https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25551448/yqry-tkhqyr-shyrvt-hbytkhvn-hklly-710.pdf.

[25] [25] “Israel Considers Easing Restrictions on Gaza,” Al-Ghad News, op. cit.

[26] “After Israeli ‘pledges,’ ‘rebel youth’ halt protests in Gaza,”Al-Araby, op. cit.

[27] Wissam Abu Shamala, “The youth uprising in Gaza… Will it bring back the return marches?,” Al-Vefagh, 19 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://cdn-newspaper.al-vefagh.ir/newspaper/1402/06/28/58c9383b1ea473182ea1b1776da94842.pdf .

[28] Ibid.

[29] “Hundreds of Jewish settlers and extremists storm Al-Aqsa courtyards,” Al-Jazeera, 17 September 2023; received online (23 February 2026): https://shorturl.at/UVh2z .

[30] Quoted in “Occupation bombs resistance observation posts,” _Arab4_8, op. cit.

[31] See Daniel Sobelman, Axis of Resistance Asymmetric Deterrence and Rules of the Game in Contemporary Middle East Conflicts (Albany, SUNY Press, 2025), p. 129, which claims that “In mid-September [2023], Hamas reignited the border protests after nearly three years.”

[32] Quoted in Nour Mahd Ali Abu Aisha, “Gaza’s incendiary balloons: motives and consequences (report)”, Anadolu Ajansı Arabic, 27 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://shorturl.at/QcL98 .

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Yusuf Faris, “Border Activities Continue: Gaza Will Not Give Up West Bank,” Al-Akhbar, 25 September 2023.

[36] Abu Shomala, Wissam. “The rebel youth movement in Gaza… Will it bring back the return marches?” Al-Wefaq newspaper, 19 September 2023); retrieved online (2 March 2026): https://cdn-newspaper.al-vefagh.ir/newspaper/1402/06/28/58c9383b1ea473182ea1b1776da94842.pdf .

[37] “Gaza Strip: 28 Palestinians wounded by Israeli fire in border clashes,” Le Monde with AP, 22 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/09/22/gaza-strip-28-palestinians-wounded-by-israeli-fire-in-border-clashes/_6138648/_4.htm

[38] Quoted in “Israel strikes Gaza again amid Palestinian border protests,” AFP, 23 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/508945.aspx

[39]Youssef Abu Watfa, “Escalation continues on Gaza border… Unity of the arenas confirmed,” Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 24 September 2023.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Youssef Faris, “Border Activities Continue: Gaza Will Not Give Up West Bank,” Al-Akhbar, 25 September 2023; retrieved online (2 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/1pbEi .

[42] Quoted in ibid.

[43] Quoted in ibid.

[44] Quoted in ibid.

[45] “Occupation forces bomb targets in Gaza and cause injuries near the separation fence,” al-Jazeera, 26 September 2023; retrieved online (22 February 2026): https://shorturl.at/GQOhu .

[46] Rajab al-Madhun, “Resistance Imposes Its Conditions for a Calm-Down: Gaza Activities Suspended in Exchange for Not Attacking Al-Aqsa,” Al-Akhbar, 29 September 2023.

[47] Netanel Flamer, The Hamas Intelligence War against Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024), p.3. Flamer is a student of Eliezer Tauber and, like his mentor, his explication heavily hews towards Zionist narratives; nevertheless, his research makes valuable use of various primary security documents.

[48] This was documented by the by RasadAlmedan Telegram’s “Field Report” from 27 September 2023, which read: “Young men detonate homemade explosive devices near the separation fence east of Khan Yunis.” See: Field Report, @RasadAlmedan (Telegram); retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://t.me/s/RasadAlmedan/110322.

[49] Quds Breaking, @Qudsn_Brk (Telegram), 17 September 2026; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://t.me/s/Qudsn/_Brk/21139. A video posted on Gaza Live, @gazalivee (Telegram) also documented “the moment Palestinian youths crossed the separation fence east of the Gaza Strip”; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://t.me/s/gazalivee?after=42341.

[50] Hamza al-Masri, @hamza20300 (Telegram), retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://t.me/s/hamza20300?after=65520.

[51] Quoted in “For the Israeli press: ‘The Daily Report.’ Press Office – Group 194, 24.” 22 March 2024; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://group194.net/article/122693. Tuesday, 26 September 2023, Field Monitor News Network (@MatabieNews); retrieved online (29 March 2026): https://t.me/s/matabienews?before=98030 .

[52] Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Army Braced for a Yom Kippur Attack. A Month Later, Hamas Found a Defenseless Gaza Border.” HaAretz, 21 March 2024.

[53] As Flamer, op. cit., pp. 132-133, recounts:

Israel built an underground barrier with advanced technologies along the border fence with the Gaza Strip to keep Hamas operatives in Gaza from penetrating Israel through tunnels. After Operation Protective Edge, and in the context of the lessons learned from the State Comptroller’s report on the topic, Israel embarked on an orderly process of constructing the barrier while ensuring cooperation among the relevant project partners. The final decision on the route best suited for the construction of the barrier was made in June 2016, with Israel willing to invest nearly NIS 3 billion in the effort. The plan was to construct a barrier to be dug dozens of meters into the ground and about 6 meters aboveground along more than 60 kilometers of border. Dozens engineers and laborers worked around the clock for some three years; the project reached its completion in October 2020.

Also see Raphael D. Marcus, “Learning ‘Under Fire’: Israel’s Improvised Military Adaptation to Hamas Tunnel Warfare,” Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 3–4 (2019): 344–370; Testimonials by engineers and laborers, “Solel boneh mazigah – hamikhshol hatat karkai bigvul rezuat azah,” YouTube, December 30, 2018, www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC-FNZFKJ9k

[54] RasadAlmedan, “Field Report,” op. cit., 27 September 2023. Almost immediately thereafter, the same Telegram channel noted that “[a] Palestinian targeted the Israeli military’s cameras along the Gaza border.”

[55] Al Jazeera Investigative Unit. “7 أكتوبر.” Al-Jazeera, 21 March 2024; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/SRGDH.

[56] Zuhair Hamdani and Talal Mashati, “’The Shame’ That Befell Israel… Details of the First Hours of the Collapse,” Al Jazeera, 15 October 2023; last updated 29 February 2024; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/HTAcg.

[57] “’Israeli Intelligence in Shock’… Hamas Hacked Soldiers’ Cameras and Phones Before October 7,” Al-Mayadeen, 14 March 2024; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://shorturl.at/GvhFl. Also see Mujamma Haraket, “The Hackers of the Islamic Resistance Movement,” Substack, 19 March 2026; retrieved online (28 March 2026): https://mujammaharaket.substack.com/p/the-hackers-of-the-islamic-resistance.

[58] This even seemingly had an indirect influence on how scholars perceived the movement, evidenced in Tareq Baconi’s conclusion that “Hamas appeared to have been once again effectively contained and temporarily pacified within the Gaza Strip” in Hamas Contained (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), p. 223; and “ Tarek Hamoud’s references to the socializing influence of the “Axis of Containment” (viz., Turkey, Qatar, Egypt) in “Socialising Hamas. Evaluating the Structural Political Developments in the Islamic Palestinian Resistance Movement as A Ruling Authority Between 2006-2017”, Doctor of Philosophy in Palestine Studies, University of Exeter, 2023, p. 50, 225-227, 233-238, pp. 329-330.

[59] According to Hamas official Jasser al-Barghouti, Muhammed al-Deif, reflecting on the raids on al-Aqsa Mosque, remarked, “I am ready, if the political leadership is ready,” in a manner that presaged the 7 October 2023; see Al-Deif quoted in Mahmoud Mardawi and Jasser al-Barghouti Interview with Ahmed Mansour, “Why did Sinwar reject the establishment of a state in Gaza?”, op. cit.