I found this article from Die Zeit quite sobering to read, hence my post. So, in general, the russian citizens seem to be just fine and dandy with what is going on. What’s the lesson in this? I don’t know. Maybe: Don’t expect any change from within in the east. Fortification is the only option for a predictable future. Something like that.

Here’s an archived version of this article. Not linked on purpose to not give them any backlink tracking: archive (d0t) is /4JE6r

Here’s a translation:

What Do Further Sanctions Against Russia Accomplish?

Europe and the US want to force a ceasefire in Ukraine. They are threatening new punitive measures. What this means for Russia’s population – and for Putin.

By Alexander Kauschanski and Anne-Sophie Lang

May 13, 2025, 20:35

Anyone who wants to buy a stick of butter in Russia in 2025 often reaches right next to the caviar in the supermarket. That’s where the butter is, in theft-proof plastic containers. Other staple foods like potatoes, onions, apples, and milk are also as expensive as luxury goods in the third year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Russian war economy is overheated, driving prices skyward. In March 2025, the inflation rate was 10 percent compared to the same month the previous year. This was compounded by crop failures – and international sanctions. Now new ones are set to be added.

The European Union has adopted 16 sanctions packages since the beginning of Russia’s full invasion. On Wednesday, it apparently plans to present a 17th. Together with the US, it had issued Russia an ultimatum: If ruler Vladimir Putin rejected a 30-day unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine, significantly harsher sanctions would follow. The deadline for the ultimatum has now expired. The US has imposed more than 6,500 sanctions against Russia since 2022, the EU more than 2,000. How realistic is it that additional punitive measures could move the Kremlin to action?

Sanctions Have Little Effect on the Population

International sanctions hardly worry the Russian population anymore – this was stated by almost three-quarters of respondents in a survey by the independent polling institute Levada in March 2025. The trend is increasing. While two-thirds had said in the previous month that rising prices were the most pressing problem in their country, the impact of sanctions on inflation is hardly perceived, says Janis Kluge, who researches the Russian economy at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). “Russia has drummed into its population that sanctions cannot achieve anything.”

Economically, the Russian population is doing well, at least on average: Real household incomes have risen even more than inflation. Due to labor shortages, even unskilled workers now earn good money – and spend it. Domestic tourism is booming. Glittering shopping malls showcase designer fashion from Western brands, and the latest iPhones from the US are available in electronics stores.

Sanctions Can Be Circumvented

This is also part of the reality of sanctions: Ways are always found to circumvent them and at least somewhat mitigate their effect. After many companies withdrew, Russia imported Western goods via Turkey, China, and India. Other goods are produced domestically, and many electronics now come from China. In 2024, the trade volume between Russia and China was higher than ever before.

New sanctions often have short-term shock effects that subside after a few weeks to months, says Russia expert Vasily Astrov from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW). The sanctioned country often finds loopholes, says Astrov: “It’s a cat-and-mouse game.”

Imports are paid for with cryptocurrencies, foreign subsidiaries are established, ships with non-transparent ownership structures are sent out. For some time now, Russian banks have shielded business with China using their own payment system, nicknamed “China Track.” Through this system, they can process import and export transactions without Western banks and authorities knowing about it. This is meant to reduce the risk of so-called secondary sanctions against China – sanctions directed against states that trade with Russia.

US President Trump recently brought such secondary sanctions into play: Countries like India or Turkey could be punished if they obtain energy from Russia. A bill by US Senator Lindsey Graham, an ally of Trump, proposes 500 percent tariffs on trade with countries that purchase Russian energy products. Conversely, the Trump administration is considering easing sanctions against Russia if it agrees to a ceasefire.

EU Plans to End Russian Energy Imports Completely

The EU plans to further expand existing sanctions against Russia in its newly planned package. Dozens of companies are to be punished more consistently if they circumvent existing sanctions or supply the Russian defense industry.

One target of the European punitive measures is Russia’s oil and gas business: By 2027, the EU wants to stop all energy exports from Russia – as even in 2024, EU states spent more money on fossil fuels from Russia than on financial aid to Ukraine. 150 tankers transporting Russian oil would no longer be allowed to call at EU ports. This so-called shadow fleet circumvents sanctions by concealing its origin and owners. But at the moment, these measures would have little effect anyway: To limit Russian export earnings, the EU only allows the transport of Russian oil as long as the price is below $60 per barrel – a kind of price cap. Since the market price is currently below this limit anyway, many ships can legally transport Russian oil – even without belonging to the shadow fleet.

It Is Difficult to Exert Economic Pressure

“The EU is finding it difficult to exert economic pressure on Russia,” says Janis Kluge from SWP. “A 17th EU sanctions package will hardly impress Putin anymore.” More concerning to Putin than new sanctions would be additional weapon deliveries to Ukraine – which could also be expanded almost at will. Unlike sanctions, whose potential is simply exhausted at some point. Kluge says: “If the West massively supports Ukraine with weapons, it will be difficult for Russia to maintain the belief in victory.”

It’s not as if existing sanctions aren’t causing any damage to Russia. Since the full invasion, Russia has lost several hundred billion US dollars in export earnings, says Kluge. This limits the Russian state’s options. “Increasing the defense budget becomes more difficult in Russia if painful cuts in social spending have to be made,” explains Kluge. “There’s a lot of sand in the gears. It’s not existential for Putin, but a significant limitation.” Often, the actual effects of sanctions only become clear in the long term. WIIW expert Astrov therefore calls them “a creeping poison.” “It’s really about decades.”

Some Sanctions Are More Effective Than Others

Some sanctions have proven more useful from a Western perspective than others: Freezing the assets of oligarchs in Western accounts was rather counterproductive, says Astrov. This has actually tied Russia’s super-rich more closely to Putin and made them invest in Russia rather than abroad. The secondary sanctions against companies from third countries, already imposed under former US President Joe Biden, had more of an impact on Russia.

What options remain for the West? It would be effective to further restrict Russian oil exports, says SWP researcher Kluge. If these were to shrink significantly, it could lead to an economic crisis in Russia – and shake the regime in the Kremlin. However, this cannot be implemented in the short term, as the needed oil would have to be quickly sourced elsewhere. Most likely, says Kluge, from Saudi Arabia – which would have to be pressured by the US in such a scenario. “But this comes with the energy-policy risk that oil prices would rise and Western societies would get into difficulties,” says Kluge. “So it’s borderline how realistic this is.”

That existing sanctions cannot be ineffective is also shown by the fact that Russia regularly calls on Western countries to lift them. The exclusion from the Swift system must have been particularly painful: Russia regularly demands from Europe and the US to be reconnected to the international payment system.

In the future, the economic effects of sanctions could intensify. The exorbitant state spending on armaments had increased the gross domestic product in recent years: According to official figures, it grew by more than four percent each in 2023 and 2024. This year, the Russian economy could grow only slightly or even shrink for the first time. But as long as Russia can keep the war machine running, the Kremlin will not end the war in Ukraine.

And two more things are foreseeable: Even with new sanctions, Russia will find loopholes – and large parts of the population will probably continue to accept the expensive butter for a while. On average, Russians have never been as satisfied with their lives as during the war, researchers from the Bank of Finland found. The war and aggressive foreign policy, one of the scientists suspects in the Russian exile media Meduza, has given many Russians the feeling that Russia is moving in the right direction. Despite hundreds of thousands of dead, despite inflation, and despite sanctions.