More than ever, Ukraine needs support to transition towards a long-term energy system that is resilient, flexible and secure. The EU has the expertise, the ability and the will to help make that happen.

Ukraine’s energy system has endured relentless and brutal attacks by Russia. Yet, through incredible skill and resourcefulness, Ukraine has managed to keep the lights on through the winter. Now the unpredictable Trump administration has begun haphazardly withdrawing air defences and intelligence while using nuclear power stations as bargaining chips. More than ever, Ukraine needs support to transition towards a long-term energy system that is resilient, flexible and secure. The EU has the expertise, the ability and the will to help make that happen.

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Ukraine’s renewables sector has also shown considerable resilience, despite the seizure of key assets by Russian forces. Renewable energy sources (RES) continue to supply 8.7% of Ukraine’s energy, down from 9.4% in 2021. However, this decline is largely due to the occupation of territory rather than the destruction of infrastructure. Over 40% of Ukraine’s pre-2022 RES in solar PV and wind power currently lies in occupied territory. Wind generation capacity, once concentrated in the now occupied regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, has been especially hard hit. The Russian destruction of the Kakhovka dam has also significantly reduced Ukraine’s hydroelectric generation capacity.

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All in all, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the immense challenge of ensuring a reliable energy supply in wartime.

The biggest problem is fixed, high-value infrastructure. The crippling of Ukraine’s thermal capacity – illustrated by the destruction of the Kurakhivska thermal power plant – demonstrates just how exposed these critical assets are to targeted attacks. Even with sophisticated air defences, an overwhelming swarm of drones and/or missiles can inflict irreparable damage with long-term consequences. Repair efforts can only accomplish so much, with roughly only 5 GW of over 25 GW of lost generation capacity restored in two years.

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A decentralised energy network – built around multiple small, localised generation nodes linked together through a meshed grid – offers extensive resilience against Russian attacks. Why?

  • The first reason is attrition. By bringing generation down to a single solar panel or wind turbine, it flips the cost calculation of mass drone or missile attacks on its head. While it might make sense to launch a swarm of Shahed-136 drones at $20,000 a piece against a multi-million dollar energy facility, it makes little strategic or economic sense against a $100 solar panel or even a $2000 wind turbine.

  • The second is flexibility. A large power station or high-voltage grid system requires specialised equipment and months to relocate or rebuild. A collection of solar modules with a battery can be loaded into the back of a van and redeployed within minutes. Portable gas turbines are moveable but with limited air defence and required gas supply, they are slightly less agile even while offering continuous electricity supply.

  • The third is speed. Solar power is the quickest and cheapest way to deploy electricity generation. In the face of sudden attacks, solar can quickly fill some gaps in the electricity system. Especially when combined with battery storage, it offers a rapid and reliable source of electricity, albeit in lower volumes.

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Looking ahead, the EU should apply the lessons from Ukraine to strengthen its own energy system – building resilience and removing structural vulnerabilities. One critical area is in the power grid: while one interconnector is vulnerable, one hundred smaller connections are resilient.

In an era of growing geopolitical uncertainty, energy security is one thing that can still be actively safeguarded.