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maltfield

@ maltfield @lemmy.ml

Posts
4
Comments
14
Joined
3 yr. ago

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • I am guessing they don’t have an IP protection for liquid/dust.

    The product page's specification's section lists it as having "IP66 certification: Splash proof and dust resistant"

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • Before this launch, could you walk into a store in The Netherlands, pay cash, and walk out with a anonymously-purchased SHIFT phone?

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • Can you walk into a store in The Netherlands, pay cash, and walk out with a anonymously-purchased SHIFT phone?

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • looks like they're collaborating by giving some of their profits upstream, and creating feature requests

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • hardened LinaegeOS forks seems like exactly what we need...

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • Isn't the whole point that this thing can be upgraded?

    Also, Pixel 3 still runs great, once you strip off all the google spyware.

  • NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

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  • Android @lemmy.world
    maltfield @lemmy.ml

    NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

    novacustom.com /privacy-friendly-phone/
  • Privacy @lemmy.ml
    maltfield @lemmy.ml

    NovaCustom launches privacy SHIFTphone (degoogled with iodéOS and hardware kill switches)

    novacustom.com /privacy-friendly-phone/

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • That's bad.

    OAuth supports several types of flows. If I'm not mistaken (I've learned a bit more about OAuth since yesterday) you're describing the Authorization Code Flow -- as documented in RFC 6749 (The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework), Section 4.1 (Authorization Code Grant):

    That RFC defines many other types of flows that do not require sharing the access keys with a third party, such as the Client Credentials Flow, as documented in RFC 6749 Section 4.4 (Client Credentials Grant):

    The only reason you'd want to use the Authorization Code Flow is if the third party needs your access token for some reason, or if you want to hide the access key from the user agent.

    The problem here is that Stripe is using the wrong flow (the third party doesn't need the access token, as they claim they never save it anyway). And if keyCloak only supports that one flow, that's would be a problem too (in this case).

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • Upon further reading of RFC 6749, it appears that OAuth does require this -- sometimes.

    It depends on the OAuth Flow. In this case, Stripe uses the “Authorization Code” Grant.

    This is documented in Stripe’s OAuth reference documentation here:

     
        
curl https://connect.stripe.com/oauth/token \
  -u sk_test_MgvkTWK1jRG3olSRx9B7Mmxo: \
  -d “code”=”ac_123456789” \
  -d “grant_type”=”authorization_code”

    Authorization Code Grants are defined in RFC 6749 (The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework), Section 4.1 (Authorization Code Grant):

    To better understand why the OAuth Authorization Code Grant requires sharing the access token with a thrid party server, I found this article (Common OAuth Vulnerabilities) by Doyensec very elucidating:

    It says that the Authorization Code Flow is supposed to be used when you don’t want to share the tokens with the user agent.

    The Authorization Code Flow is one of the most widely used OAuth flows in web applications. Unlike the Implicit Flow, which requests the Access Token directly to the Authorization Server, the Authorization Code Flow introduces an intermediary step. In this process, the User Agent first retrieves an Authorization Code, which the application then exchanges, along with the Client Credentials, for an Access Token. This additional step ensures that only the Client Application has access to the Access Token, preventing the User Agent from ever seeing it.

    But this doesn't make sense for this use-case. It appears Stripe is needlessly putting us at risk by choosing the Authorization Code Grant.

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • Stripe Connect does not support Client Credentials flow.

    Can you please tell me what is the name of the "flow" that Stripe Connect is using here?

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • I figured out the root technical cause. It's because Stripe doesn't allow the redirect during the OAuth flow to be dynamic. It must be a predefined value that's hard-coded into the app.

    For security purposes, Stripe redirects a user only to a predefined URI.

    That's why Stripe forces you to expose your access tokens to the developer's servers.

    I'd still appreciate if someone with more experience with OAuth than me knows if this is common. Seems like a very bad design decision to require users to transmit their bearer tokens through the developer's servers.

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • It’s called the Client Credentials flow (RFC 6749, Section 4.4).

    Finally someone directs me to the actual RFC. Except that section is titled "Client Credentials Grant"

    Why do I see this sometimes called a "Grant" and sometimes called a "Flow"?

    What's the definition and difference of each?

  • Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

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  • Thanks, but I don't think this is the case here. The Authentication provider is Stripe (or, at least, it's a stripe.com domain name). The 3rd party is the app developer's server.

    Stripe's infra is already PCI compliant.

    I'm not sure how a hardware security token would be relevant here. The end result must be something-you-know access token. Initial setup is done with 2FA, sure. But I don't think the server can store (or emulate) a passkey. The issue here isn't how I authenticate with Stripe. It's after that -- when Stripe gives the tokens to the third party (the dev's server) and then the third party gives the token to my server. I don't understand why Stripe doesn't just let the devs implement it so Stripe gives the tokens directly to my server.

  • /c/cybersecurity - Cybersecurity News & Discussion @lemmy.ml
    maltfield @lemmy.ml

    Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?

  • Security @lemmy.ml
    maltfield @lemmy.ml

    Why OAuth MUST share access token with 3rd party?!?