Meshal responded to persistent calls from Abbas to accept past agreements : “There is proof that Israel does not care for the Palestinian people, does not recognize their rights and does not abide by any agreement signed with them. Moreover, it does not even consider Mahmoud Abbas nor Yasser Arafat as Palestinian partners… Where is the benefit for the people to tie themselves in agreements that time has annulled ?”

From Hamas Contained : The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance, by Tareq Baconi
Frankly the mods can delete this post if it’s out of topic, nobody cares about that now, i just wanted to remind pro and anti-Hamas people that Hamas could have accepted a two-states solution(, and it’s far from the only proof, it’s even in the art.20 of their charter). It wouldn’t sit well with most palestinian fighters, but would be seen as necessary and then, with enough time, acceptable, i’m in favor of religious diversity even if a european has no right to ask middle-easterners to do such sacrifice, it’s not that much land so europeans could/should give them an acceptable compensation. And it’s perhaps stupid but couldn’t the third temple be fused with al-Aqsa ? Both sides would certainly be displeased but it’s physically doable.
Now i’m just eagerly waiting for supposedly God-fearing israelis(, who claim to represent jewishness !,) to be treated as they’re treating palestinians, seems fair.
Beyond the genocide, what’s the point of mistreating prisoners if not a lack of empathy towards fellow humans ?

Israel just murdered Hamas’ head negotiator, in Qatar, since they don’t care about negotiating, nor fear nonexistent consequences for their actions.
Meanwhile, as usual since the 90s :

From the year 2000 until Operation Cast Lead broke out, Israel had killed more than 3,000 Palestinians in Gaza, including 634 children. Seen in this context, Cast Lead was a continuation of Israel’s use of sheer force to break Hamas, and in the process to circumvent all the political gestures that the movement had offered Israel. This was despite warnings from senior figures such as the previous head of the Mossad, Efraim Halevy, who insisted that Hamas had already indicated a willingness to compromise to achieve a two-state solution and was open to negotiations. (source)

(i’m not saying that Hamas was openly supporting a two-states solution, but that it could/would have with a less hopeless behavior from Israel)

If palestinians will never accept a two-states solution along the 1967 borders, regardless of anything that israelis could do, then israelis are only left with one option.
If the israeli government will never accept a two-states solution along the 1967 borders, regardless of anything that palestinians could do to reassure them, then palestinians are only left with one option.

From the author’s conclusion(, sources omitted, and i’m not certain about the percentage of truth that there is in his assertions, makes you think). Start from the sentence in bold if you’re in a hurry :

« Israeli leaders consistently present Hamas as nothing more than an irrational and bloodthirsty actor seeking Israel’s destruction. This framing is part of a longer history of sidestepping the political concerns that animate Palestinian nationalism by labeling movements such as Hamas and the PLO as terrorist organizations. (…) Hamas adopts armed resistance on a localized front to end an occupation that is deemed illegal by international law. (…) Instead of addressing this reality or engaging with Hamas’s political drivers, Israel has adopted a military approach that defines Hamas solely as a terrorist organization.
(…)
Like Hamas, the PLO was ostracized until it accepted formulaic conditions that had been dictated by the United States : the renunciation of armed struggle, and the recognition of Israel. The PLO believed, rightly, that ideological concessions would allow it to negotiate with Israel. It also imagined, mistakenly, that diplomacy would lead to Palestinian statehood. Hamas has learned this lesson and is unlikely to concede on any of its core ideological tenets without guarantees that such compromises would lead to the fulfillment of Palestinian rights.
(…)
The second factor is that Hamas has what it sees as two resounding victories that justify armed struggle. Israel’s withdrawals from south Lebanon in 2000 and from the Gaza Strip in 2005 were both unilateral Israeli measures taken after years of armed resistance in each of these locales. Rather than the byproduct of diplomacy or negotiations, these instances of “liberation” are perceived by Hamas as the vindication of resistance.

While remaining ideologically inflexible, Hamas has offered pragmatic concessions when dealing with the three conditions imposed by the international community : renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept past agreements. As various chapters in this book demonstrate, Hamas has issued repeated offers to end its violence in return for Israeli reciprocity.
Throughout the years of the Second Intifada and afterward, Hamas intermittently held fire unilaterally in the face of rapid Israeli militarization. Israel has consistently ignored these overtures.
Even after its takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas became increasingly effective at policing Gaza’s borders, yet calm interludes were systematically ignored by Israel, which maintained its violent chokehold and incursions into the strip.
Hamas also made great strides with regard to accepting past agreements, offering to abide by whatever outcome a reformed and representative PLO puts forward. This concession has been made even as successive Israeli governments have themselves failed to respect or uphold past agreements.
By 2007, when Hamas accepted the Mecca Agreement, the movement declared its willingness to respect international agreements and defer to the PLO in negotiations with Israel. These political concessions have consistently been deemed insufficient.

The issue that has proven most intractable is Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel. In many ways, this is the backbone of Hamas’s ideology. It is both the final trump card before reaching a settlement and the last line that must be defended to safeguard the imagined purity of Palestinian nationalism.
For decades, Hamas has explicitly and repeatedly indicated its willingness to accept the creation of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, most recently by issuing a revised political manifesto in 2017.
Even prior to its election victory in 2006, Hamas consistently explained that its use of armed struggle was limited to forcing Israel to end its occupation rather than the destruction of the state as a whole.
Hamas’s leaders believe this would offer a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians and end the bloodshed. Israel is convinced this would be a temporary solution before Hamas rearms and attacks from a strengthened position.
While Hamas may indeed continue to harbor ideological aspirations for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine after such a peaceful settlement, the likelihood that the movement would have popular backing for such a step is likely to be nonexistent if a just settlement is offered. Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept those outcomes until the deal is implemented (source). [And Israel has the atomic bomb]

It is more likely the case that Hamas is simply maintaining this ideological intransigence as a negotiating tactic and a matter of principle, tying into the movement’s legitimacy and its effectiveness as an interlocutor.
(…)
Hamas’s implicit acceptance of Israel has gone far beyond what many Israeli political parties, including the dominant ruling Likud party, have offered Palestinians within their charters. With their refusal to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination, their insistence that the Palestinian people never existed, and the intermittent resurfacing of the “Jordan option”, several Israeli political parties have long opposed the notion of a Palestinian state. In 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly reneged on his highly touted 2009 Bar Ilan speech in which he spoke of the possibility of a demilitarized Palestinian state.

Hamas leaders consistently reaffirmed how their acceptance of the 1967 line is a negotiating tactic made in the full conviction that Israel itself refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of this border.
Israel’s refusal to countenance Hamas’s repeated offers around the 1967 line reaffirm this conviction. Israel’s demand for Hamas’s ideological concession prior to any form of diplomatic engagement is likely to remain futile.
The PLO’s experience shows that Israel has hardly acted as a benevolent occupier. If Hamas were to shift its own policies and accept the Quartet’s conditions, it would lose valuable political capital and negotiating clout. Hamas has long called on Palestinian diplomats to hold on to their trump cards rather than negotiate in good faith. Should Israel ever choose to pursue a peace option or itself accept the legitimacy of the 1967 borders, admittedly an unlikely development given the current political climate in Israel, Hamas would present a powerful and effective counterpart. Yet rather than empowering its negotiating partners, Israel has historically pursued a self-fulfilling prophecy that ensures there is “no partner” by weakening its counterparts and undermining their legitimacy.

Israel’s refusal to deal with Hamas’s diplomatic signals is not solely the result of the movement’s use of armed struggle. Hamas’s political emergence within the Gaza Strip heightened Israeli worries by rupturing the continued subservience of the Palestinian institutions to the occupation. This compliance had become concretized in the body of the Palestinian Authority following the Oslo Accords. By resuscitating key Palestinian demands that the PLO had conceded, including the goal of liberating historic Palestine, Hamas has attempted to take Palestinian nationalism back to a pre-Oslo period. The Oslo Accords have facilitated the continuation of Israel’s occupation and have been followed by a failed peace process that has resumed for two decades at significant cost to Palestinians, while Israel expanded its settlement enterprise. Hamas’s efforts to undo the political structures that Oslo created challenged a status quo that has been sustainable, if not beneficial, for Israel and its colonization of Palestinian territories.
In essence, Hamas’s takeover of Gaza marked the failure of Israel’s efforts to centralize Palestinian decision-making with compliant figures like Mahmoud Abbas, who in effect allow Israel to maintain its occupation cost-free. »

I don’t care if Hamas disappears if it leads to a two-states solution along the 1967 borders with east-Jerusalem as their capital(, we know they would love to as well), and i’m gladly surprised that France chose to ‘go further than asking for an end of the “war”/‘unilateral massacre of civilians’’/‘hold a conference with Saudi Arabia on this topic(, the second one is in 12 days)’, because that’s the problem.

I know that some palestinians do speak of destroying Israel, surely they could ask for guarantees, and there’s a talk of a confederation which would make sense because the settlers would simply be jews accepting to leave under an islamic government, mirroring the muslims in Israel, with guarantees from each side to respect each other minorities. Surely if all goes well this confederation could unite one day.