The in-house Python script behind eMudhra’s October key compromise has now cost the company 8 more of its intermediate certificate authorities (CAs), even though it did not weaken their keys.

Each intermediate CA has its own private key, which the company uses to sign the certificates it issues. The 8 intermediate CAs compromised in October had a different problem: a single line in the script

  • Sarah Reid@lemmy.world
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    6 hours ago

    YSK this is exactly why an ‘unaffected’ list from a CA in the middle of a key compromise should be treated as provisional. These 8 were declared fine before, and now they’re revoked too, because the script exposed the keys to process memory during an HSM transfer.

    Practical steps if you run anything public-facing: inventory every cert in your estate and its issuing CA, check the full chain (not just the leaf) against the revoked list, and update trust stores on servers, load balancers and anything internal that chains up to them. If you find one, re-issue from a different CA rather than waiting to see if it gets revoked next. And set a reminder to re-check in a week or two, these things tend to expand, as this story shows.

    It’s a pain, but it’s a lot less painfull than finding out a cert your customers trust was issued from a compromised key. CheetahHybrid had the right idea removing them early, better safe than sorry untill the dust settles.