The €1 billion extended to [North Macedonia Prime Minister] Hristijan Mickoski’s government is Hungarian on paper but may have been backed by Chinese capital. Hungary’s new government is now investigating why Hungarian taxpayers were made to assume the risks of this unusually favourable deal.
One billion euros entered Hungary from three Chinese banks. Several months later, another €1 billion began moving from Hungary’s state-owned Eximbank to North Macedonia.
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The amounts match. So does the timing. The political relationship between then-Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and Hristijan Mickoski’s newly installed government was openly displayed. This has turned the loan to Skopje into one of the most controversial financial operations of Orbán’s now-defeated government.
Following the change of power in Budapest, the controversy is no longer merely political. Hungary’s new government filed a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators, the police opened formal proceedings, and investigators seized thousands of pages of documents on 31 August 2026.
The investigation concerns suspected abuse of office and mismanagement of public funds. No individual has been charged and no crime has yet been proven, but the North Macedonian loan is now the subject of an official criminal investigation.
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On 19 April 2024, the Hungarian state drew a €1 billion loan from China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China and the Hungarian branch of Bank of China. It was the largest non-bond loan in the history of Hungary’s sovereign debt.
The Orbán government did not announce the transaction. It became public in July through data released by Hungary’s Government Debt Management Agency. The interest rate remains undisclosed, while the loan has a floating rate and a short maturity date: April 2027. Officially, the money may be used for infrastructure, transport, energy and high-technology projects. Portfolio.hu
Only three months after Hungary drew down the Chinese loan, Orbán and Mickoski agreed on Hungarian financing for North Macedonia during the NATO summit in Washington. Mickoski had taken office in Skopje barely a month earlier.
An accelerated procedure followed. On 17 September, the North Macedonian parliament adopted a special law authorising the borrowing. The first €500 million agreement was signed on 8 October, followed by another €500 million agreement on 20 December 2024.
The terms were exceptionally favourable to North Macedonia: a fixed interest rate of 3.25 per cent, a 15-year maturity and a three-year grace period.
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This is where the Chinese trail emerges.
The investigative network VSquare reported, citing several diplomatic sources, that the money extended to Skopje was connected to the Chinese loan Hungary had received shortly beforehand. Under this scenario, Hungary was acting as a financial intermediary, channeling Chinese capital and influence into the Western Balkans. VSquare
The connection is plausible but has not been conclusively documented. No published contract, bank statement or official decision demonstrates that the Chinese billion was specifically earmarked for North Macedonia. The two loans also have substantially different terms: Hungary received three-year financing with a floating interest rate but extended a 15-year loan at a fixed rate.
Budapest was therefore not simply acting as a postbox. The Hungarian state assumed the risks arising from the different maturities and interest rates, as well as the possibility that North Macedonia might fail to service its debt.
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Hungary’s new government says the loan was extended without the standard risk premium … The Hungarian state issued a 100 per cent guarantee, assuming the full risk in the event of non-payment. The Hungarian budget must also cover more than 90 billion forints in interest-rate compensation because Eximbank provided the money below its own financing costs.
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The essential terms were approved through an individual decision by the Orbán government and by then-economy minister Márton Nagy. According to the new administration, this raises the question of whether public resources intended to support Hungarian exports and businesses were instead used to finance a foreign political ally. Hungarian Government
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Following Orbán’s defeat, the loan remains legally in force, but its political function has changed. What once appeared to demonstrate the special relationship between Budapest and Skopje has become a potential liability for the North Macedonian government.
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The greatest danger for Mickoski is not that the credit agreements will be immediately terminated. The investigation does not in itself invalidate them. The real risk lies in what the documents may reveal about how the decision was made, the true cost to the Hungarian budget and the selection of the ultimate beneficiaries.
If investigators establish that state resources were used to subsidise a political ally and connected business circles, the case will cease to be merely a controversial financial transaction. It will become a cross-border political corruption scandal with a Chinese trail.
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