Europe is a continent under siege. To begin with, consider the Ceuta crisis and the subsequent suspension of the Schengen agreement toward Spain by Italy.

Add to this a series of “hybrid warfare” episodes: an explosives-laden drone that miraculously failed to detonate against a Ukrainian plane at Leipzig airport, the explosion of a munitions factory in Colleferro, near Rome, and that of an arms manufacturing plant in Bulgaria—both part of a support program for Ukraine.

[Op-ed by Marco Buti, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa chair at the Robert Schuman Centre; and Francesco Nicoli, assistant professor of political science at the Politecnico Institute of Turin.]

Europe is entangled in a security “fragmentation trap”: perceived short-term national costs of common defense prevail over its real, medium-to-long-term collective benefits.

It is a classic vicious cycle: divisions prevent Europe from adopting effective common institutions and policies, and in their absence, adversaries successfully exploit these very rifts to widen them and divide the continent further.

Whoever pushed the masses of migrants toward Ceuta aimed not only at placing the Spanish government in a difficult position, but also at disrupting European unity (a plan that succeeded completely).

Similarly, the continuous expansion of Russian-driven hybrid warfare is only possible because our fragmented security institutions has proven incapable of reacting adequately, not least because the absence of a true European intelligence agency renders counterintelligence operations far more complex.

Finally, the demand for personal loyalty to [U.S.} President Trump and ideological alignment with MAGA has laid bare the increasingly neo-feudal character of the relationship between the US and its allies … The objective is clear: the collapse of international law—upon which both NATO and the EU are built—and the transformation of European security from a public alliance codified in treaty into a private pact of vassalage.

Next year, seven countries will go to the polls, including France, Italy, Poland, and Spain, which together account for 48% of the EU population. Here, far-right nationalist, anti-European, and often pro-Russian forces are dictating the policy agenda to both governments and oppositions.

Political incentives must change.

First, the “butter vs. guns” narrative must be challenged: without stepping up the investments in security, there will be neither guns (or their modern equivalent) nor butter (welfare transfers).

Second, military spending today mostly consists of investments in technological innovation with significant positive spillovers for growth: a security policy is, for all intents and purposes, an industrial policy.

Third, as threats against European countries reach the heart of the EU, pro-European political forces must convince citizens that we face an imminent threat: it is astonishing how an attack such as the sabotage of the Colleferro factory passed almost unnoticed in Italy.

It is wholly illusory to believe Europe can withstand Trump’s trade and digital pressures, or push forward with the Draghi-Letta agenda on competitiveness and the Single Market, without strategic convergence on defense. Integration will be gradually undermined, even in areas of strict EU competence.

The only alternative to common defense is a weakening Europe, progressively carved up among new global empires, and progressively at risk of internal conflict … Actually, there may be in many EU countries a political demand waiting for the an adequate political supply.

Polls show strong public support across national populations for viewing defense as a European public good to be provided centrally and funded jointly, especially when plans are ambitious.

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