cross-posted from: https://scribe.disroot.org/post/12560027
- As the US threat grows, Canadians see China as less of a foe
- Canada’s pursuit of trade with China overlooks its human rights record
In a remarkably short period, Canadians have refashioned their assessment of China. According to polling from January 2026, the share who view China as an “enemy” or “threat” plummeted from 62 percent in 2023 to 23 percent. In 2021, nearly three-quarters of Canadians believed human rights should be prioritized over trade; five years later, 52 percent said trade and investment were more important.
This shift isn’t really about China, though. China’s government hasn’t changed its behaviour, after all. No, the changing Canadian view about China is about the United States under President Donald Trump. In February 2026, 55 percent of Canadians told pollsters that the United States was Canada’s greatest threat, compared to just 15 percent who selected China.
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But the belief that economics and values can be traded off against each other—a choice polling questions and Carney’s framing encourage—rests on a faulty premise. It wrongly assumes that the two can be neatly separated when, in fact, they are inescapably intertwined. The real dilemma is whether trade is structured to protect Canadian workers, communities, and institutions—or to expose them.
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Human rights concerns are not a moral luxury to revisit only after trade talks are completed, because those concerns are bound up with the very trade, labour, sovereignty, and security problems Canada is trying to manage. I saw this first-hand in my decade as a diplomat: authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deliberately structure economic negotiations separately from human rights dialogues so they can advance their interests through the former and deflect criticism in the latter without incurring any costs.
If some Canadians delude themselves into thinking they can safely engage with China economically without safeguards against potential extortion and manipulation, they will find themselves increasingly dependent on a political system that is hostile not just to Canadian values but that also corrodes our economy, sovereignty, and civil liberties.
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First, it must be understood that China’s Party-state does not separate human rights and political economy. China’s repression of workers’ rights is central to its commercial model. As the economist Yasheng Huang observes, China pays its workers less than many poorer countries do, and that’s one key reason why it dominates the rest of the world in making things.
China’s investment and production-driven growth model has deprived 300 million migrant workers of pensions and social protections, forcing them to produce cheap goods for the world without consuming much themselves and reducing everybody else’s wages as well. This situation persists only because the people harmed by this model have no voice and are kept in place by law under a household-registration system where minimum wages go unenforced.
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The artificially cheap exports produced by a “low-rights” economic system have helped drive a global race to the bottom in labour standards, contributing to job losses and the kind of popular resentment that has fuelled the very protectionism that Canada is trying to escape. In addition, China has failed to enforce safety or environmental protections. Both economic security hawks and human rights lawyers agree that China’s forced labour, suppressed wages, and dumped pollution are effectively “non-market subsidies” that lower production costs.
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Canadians who correctly prioritize trade overlook that labour rights enforcement, supply-chain integrity, and resistance to coercion are trade policy. They determine whether trade is fair, sustainable, and reciprocal—or whether it locks Canada into a dependency that can be weaponized by a regime notoriously willing to leverage its economic strength. Managing this tension is the essence of economic security policy.
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The most recent public report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service refers to the PRC as “the greatest counter-intelligence threat to Canada.” The Communications Security Establishment similarly deems China’s cyberespionage program “second to none.” And the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference Report, released in January 2025, identified Beijing as the primary foreign actor interfering with Canada’s democratic institutions. If Canada’s national security agencies operate on that assumption while the political message shifts to describing China as a “strategic partner,” the public gets mixed signals—and firms engaging with China are incentivized to indulge in wishful thinking that can lead to later disappointment or worse.
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It is asserted that diplomacy [regarding the enforcement of human rights laws] made behind closed doors is more effective. That may be sometimes true, but it isn’t always. Private dialogue channels remain essential but must be backed with incentives to change behaviour. Diplomatic signals that don’t generate what political scientists call an audience cost are hollow. A leader who discreetly mentions a thorny issue can claim at home to have “raised the matter” while the other government understands if it does nothing, no political price will be paid and no consequences imposed.
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Rather than vacillating between hortatory virtue signalling and cynical capitulation, Canada should adopt a third way: a concrete program of guardrails to mitigate the disadvantages of engaging with China. Each has precedents in allied democracies, and none require Canada to cease trading with China. But they all focus on continuing the relationship on terms that benefit Canadians.
Keep China-specific exposure narrower, more reversible, and concentrated away from strategic sectors—critical minerals, telecom, AI, and biotech, etc. Cap dependency so that no single Chinese import or export relationship becomes large enough to be weaponized. Make any major concessions conditional rather than permanent. The EV quota announced after Carney’s Beijing trip is a live test case: Ottawa’s own backgrounder says it is meant to catalyze Chinese joint-venture investment in Canada’s EV supply chain, which is exactly the kind of deepening sectoral entanglement that raises the political cost of later pushback.
Diversify first with trusted partners; engage China selectively where risks are manageable. As Carney himself said in September, “Greater penetration of Europe is a bigger opportunity for Canada than China is.” That’s because Europe’s economy and political systems are like ours, and we can be confident that Europeans “are not going to use the leverage against us.” That applies to the China deal too.
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Existing instruments are also useful. The Investment Canada Act already permits legally binding conditions on foreign state-owned investment in critical sectors under national-security review. Extend this logic to outbound investment screening on the US model, so Canadian capital does not flow into Chinese firms linked to surveillance, military–civil fusion, or forced labour. Beijing has shifted its own lending toward strategic sectors, including technology and rare earths.
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In addition, Canada should protect researchers and civil-society organizations from retaliatory lawfare. Beijing has sanctioned Canadian politicians and human rights advocates. Researchers in the United States, Europe, and Australia have been sued or faced similar threats close to a dozen times in recent years, half of them in the past two.
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In 2020, China’s leading EV maker BYD sued the Alliance for American Manufacturing in 2020 for a blog post that identified the company as one whose supply chains were connected to Uyghur forced labour. The case was dismissed, and the Supreme Court declined to hear BYD’s appeal. But the lawfare still reportedly cost the Alliance dearly: nearly $400,000 (US) in legal fees and the loss of some insurance coverage, as the carrier feared that “criticizing Chinese manufacturers” might “lead to allegations of defamation.”
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Within China itself, pressure is more direct. In March 2023, police in Beijing raided the offices of the Mintz Group, a New York due-diligence firm, detaining its five Chinese employees for two years and fining them about $1.5 million for the crime of “unapproved statistical work.” Mintz had reportedly been doing due diligence on supply-chain forced labour in Xinjiang. For years, Chinese security officials had been telling due-diligence firms that Xinjiang was off-limits. Within months, similar intimidation took the form of police questioning of consultancy firm Bain & Company’s Shanghai staff, televised raids on the consultancy Capvision, and a rewritten counter-espionage law.
In August 2026, Beijing went further, placing the Responsible Business Alliance and Verité, the two main Western supply-chain auditing bodies, on its countermeasures list for “assisting” American Xinjiang sanctions. Beijing further banned Chinese companies from working with them. All this means the Party-state is hostile to the very due diligence that Canadian law should require. Legal safeguards such as anti-SLAPP provisions to protect against intimidating lawsuits, institutional indemnification commitments, and allied coordination on researcher protection should be part of the toolkit.
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If Canada pursues a model of dual-track diplomacy—creating private channels for consular work and specific negotiations, and public statements to assure Canada’s reputation for protecting human rights—it can weather the diplomatic cost. Coordination with like-minded allies will also help, as Beijing cannot retaliate against everyone at once. After the United Kingdom read a joint statement on Xinjiang at the UN General Assembly in 2019, London was just fine. And the move inspired fifty governments to sign such statements. Canada must treat transnational repression as a hybrid political, security, and human rights issue.
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Yeah, this is what the article also says,