I think we’re mostly aligned here, and the gap is mainly definitional rather than an actual disagreement.

When I say “liberal,” I’m not using it to mean “supports markets” or “isn’t ideologically Marxist.” I’m referring to liberalism as a class ideology: individualism, moral universalism, faith in Western institutions, hostility to mass politics, and acceptance of imperial hierarchy, even when it’s expressed in progressive or technocratic language.

Because of that, I agree that high CPC support doesn’t automatically translate into full ideological Marxist commitment. A lot of that support is pragmatic, nationalist, or rooted in lived material improvement rather than theory. However, it’s also important to note that due to the cultural hegemony of Marxism in China (not unlike in the Soviet Union historically) even nationalism tends to operate through Marxist language and assumptions. Marxism becomes the political common sense of society.

As a result, most nationalists still stand proud under the banner of socialism, communist state leadership, and class framing, even if loosely or inconsistently. The only group that is openly hostile to Marxism are the liberals described later. That alone places them far outside the mainstream political spectrum.

The existence of market mechanisms within that framework does not make the system liberal. China’s political economy still rests on capital being subordinate to political authority, which through the mass line, even if it's unevenly and imperfectly applied in practice, draws from the people and returns a distilled political direction back to them. The commanding heights remain state-owned, long-term planning overrides profit logic, and development goals are politically defined. Liberalism requires the opposite relationship: capital dominating the state. That simply is not the case.

This is why I would push back on the idea that post-reform China is “liberal but interventionist.” Markets are being used as tools inside a socialist political structure, not as the organizing principle of society.

On Chinese liberals specifically, yes, business ghouls are absolutely part of it: real-estate speculators, finance worshippers, people who want deregulation so capital can operate without political restraint. But that’s only one segment.

Crucially, these groups are not hegemonic. They’re actively constrained and, directly suppressed by the Party.

Over the past decade especially, we’ve seen a clear shift toward reasserting political control over capital: tightening regulation of finance, cracking down on monopolistic tech firms, restricting private tutoring, and deliberately deflating the housing bubble under the principle that “houses are for living in, not for speculation.”

The disciplining of Jack Ma is probably the clearest example im the western zeitgeist. His attempt to introduce Klarna-style consumer debt and financialization into China was an attempt to import Western finance capitalism. The Party then rightfully repressed him to the great dismay and outrage of western liberals as I'm sure you saw.

There is still a long way to go, and contradictions absolutely remain, but the overall direction is clear: reining in capital, reducing financialization, and correcting the excesses of earlier reform. I’m not naive about the challenges, but I am optimistic about the trajectory at least currently however xontinued analysis and struggle remain vital to ensuring the right course.

Alongside the business elites exists the other liberal current I was mainly referring to, one best seen in certain online subcultures due to their reviled status on the mainland.

If you look at runtox-type communities or similar spaces on reddit, you’ll find extreme white-worship and cultural self-hatred, open admiration for imperial Japan, Nanjing Massacre denial or minimization, nostalgia for British colonial rule in Hong Kong, and reflexive acceptance of Western geopolitical narratives.

These people often go well beyond modern western liberalism into something more openly colonial. They portray China itself (its people, culture, and history) as the fundamental problem, and view foreign pressure, sanctions, or even imperial domination as desirable or “civilizing.”

This is why I say they are more reactionary than Western liberals. Western liberals tend to believe their values are universal; these liberals believe China must be remade in the image of the West, regardless of the human cost.

All of these groups: business ghouls, NGO-style technocrats, colonial nostalgists, and online self-hating subcultures, are different expressions of the same liberal ideological current. Some pursue profit, others pursue “values,” but both ultimately align with imperial power structures.

That’s also why they’re broadly reviled on the mainland. They have no mass base, no institutional legitimacy, and no ideological authority. Outside of insulated online spaces, they’re widely seen as selfish at best and traitorous at worst.

So when I say Chinese liberals are often more reactionary than their Western counterparts, that’s the context I mean, not ordinary people who support markets, and not citizens with mixed or pragmatic views, but a very specific ideological tendency tied directly into global liberalism and imperial hegemony.

Sorry for the wall of text.