Alaskaball [comrade/them]

Why are you profile stalking like a creep?

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Joined 5 years ago
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Cake day: July 28th, 2020

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  • The United States had a strategic goal: To prevent the USSR from introducing an alternative to the dollar, gold interstate currency.

    After the end of the war in Korea, China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam planned to join CMEA. But the Korean war ended after the death of Stalin, and the new leadership of the USSR and the CPSU, and personally N. S. Khrushchev, changed their economic orientation to pro-Western. N.S. Khrushchev, having come to power, made it clear to everyone that the idea of ​​an interstate gold ruble was untimely. And he returned the peg of the ruble to the dollar.

    Reforming his agriculture, banning gardens and household plots, and fighting religion (he even promised “… to show the world the last priest …”), he received punishment for drought and crop failures in the country. And he began to buy grain for gold on the American continent. In just a few years, N.S. Khrushchev managed to sell abroad 2,900 tons of gold (the only case in world history!) Accumulated by I. Stalin, and which were supposed to provide the gold content of the planned gold international currency - the Stalin Golden Ruble.

    If not for the sale of gold abroad, the gold reserve of our country in 1964 would be at least about 3150 tons.

    About the same gold reserve in 2010 has the entire IMF - the International Monetary Fund. For comparison: the US state gold reserve stored in the United States is - 8133.5 tons.


  • The Soviet delegation proposed at the first stage to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on customs, price, credit and commodity issues. Then they planned to carry out a gradual unification of the principles of foreign economic policy and create a “general block” trade zone. At the final stage, they planned to create an interstate settlement currency with mandatory gold content (the ruble was already prepared for this), which led to the completion of the creation of a common market. It is clear that financial and economic integration led to political integration. Around the USSR, not only socialist, but also people’s democratic and former colonies, that is, developing states, would unite.

    Unfortunately, after the death of Stalin, the authorities of the USSR and most other CMEA countries departed from the proposals of the great leader, gradually falling under the power of the dollar (and their elites under the power of the “golden calf”). They tried to “forget” about the great Stalin project. Moreover, in view of Khrushchev’s socio-economic and political adventures (“Khrushchevschina” as the first perestroika), the “Stalin gold ruble” (10 times) had to be greatly devalued and its gold content reduced. In the late 1970s, the gold content of the Soviet ruble was de facto eliminated altogether. Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet foreign trade with most countries began to be carried out in US dollars. In addition, the Soviet Union became a “donor” of developing countries and began to supply the Western world with cheap energy and industrial raw materials. And the gold reserve that was created under Stalin,

    I. Stalin understood that the world financial circles, and above all the United States, would not calmly observe the process of creating an alternative world currency, secured by gold and not tied to the dollar, and would seek a variety of methods of counteraction. But how to weaken the USSR, and not give the opportunity to appear the golden ruble? Impose a war on the USSR on foreign territory. And so it happened in Korea in 1950. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began. The results of the war for the United States: more than 1 million dead, wounded and prisoners, a huge amount of lost military equipment and weapons, $ 20 billion of funds spent. However, the main goal of the United States was achieved, which they simply don’t know about right now, or prefer not to talk, because in the midst of the Russian intelligentsia, it’s not customary to talk badly about America.


  • Stalin’s plan to create a common “non-dollar” market The transfer to the “Stalinist gold ruble” of most of the USSR’s trade with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), created in 1949, as well as with China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and a number of developing countries led to the formation of a financial and economic block. There was a common market that was free of the dollar, which means political influence of the United States.

    In the first half of April 1952, an international economic meeting was held in Moscow. At it, the Soviet delegation, headed by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Shepilov, proposed the establishment of a common market for goods, services and capital investments. It was free of the US dollar and was created in opposition to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and US expansion. At that time, the Marshall Plan was already in full force. The economies of most of Europe are dependent on the United States.

    Members of CMEA and China as early as 1951 declared the inevitability of close cooperation of all countries that do not want to subordinate the US dollar and the dictates of Western financial and trade structures. The idea was supported by countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Uruguay. These countries became co-organizers of the Moscow Forum. Interestingly, the proposal was supported by some Western countries - Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Austria. In total, 49 countries took part in the Moscow meeting. During his work, more than 60 trade, investment and scientific-technical agreements were signed. Among the basic principles of these agreements were: the exclusion of dollar payments; the possibility of barter, including for paying off debts; harmonization of policies in international economic organizations and in the global market; mutual favored nation treatment in loans, investments, loans and scientific and technical cooperation; customs and price privileges for developing countries (or their individual goods), etc.


  • How Stalin freed the ruble from the dollar

    The Soviet ruble has been pegged to the US dollar since 1937. The ruble was calculated against foreign currencies based on the US dollar. In February 1950, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, on an urgent assignment of I. Stalin, recounted the exchange rate of the new ruble. Soviet specialists, focusing on the purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar (compared the prices of goods), and brought out the figure of 14 rubles for 1 dollar. Earlier (until 1947), 53 rubles were given per dollar. However, according to the head of the Ministry of Finance Zverev and the head of Gosplan Saburov, as well as those present at the event, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Albanian leader Enver Khoji, Stalin crossed this figure on February 27 and wrote: “At most - 4 rubles.”

    Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 28, 1950 transferred the ruble to a permanent gold basis, the pegging to the dollar was canceled. The gold content of the ruble was set at 0.222168 grams of pure gold. On March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the USSR State Bank for gold was set at 4 rubles. 45 kopecks for 1 gram of pure gold. As Stalin noted, the USSR was thus protected from the dollar. After the war, the United States had dollar surpluses that they wanted to dump on other countries, shifting their financial problems to others. Joseph Stalin cited Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito ruled, as an example of perpetual financial, and therefore political dependence on the Western world. The Yugoslav currency was pegged to the “basket” of the US dollar and British pound sterling. Stalin actually predicted the future of Yugoslavia: “… sooner or later, the West will” collapse “Yugoslavia economically and politically dismember …”. His prophetic words have come true since the 1990s.

    For the first time, national money was exempted from the American dollar. According to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the United Nations European and Far Eastern Commissions (1952-1954), Stalin’s decision almost doubled the efficiency of Soviet exports. And at that time - industrial and high-tech. This happened due to exemption from dollar prices of importing countries that underestimated prices for Soviet exports. In turn, this led to an increase in production in most Soviet industries. The Soviet Union also got the opportunity to get rid of the import of technology from the United States and other countries that were oriented to the dollar and accelerate its own technological update.




  • Nevertheless, the task of economic stabilization was generally solved, and the Soviet Union reached such a level of management of large agrobiotechnical systems that guaranteed the sustainable development of artificially designed agroforestry landscapes. GOELRO’s plan (also 15 years old) gave the country a unified state energy system for industrial growth based on new technologies; the process of electrification was accompanied by the unification of enterprises into large regional complexes. The plan of nature transformation opened a new page in the economic zoning of the USSR, as it was aimed at building a unified agricultural system with controlled landscapes. In the future, it would be possible to synthesize systems with combined resource management and technology (primarily integrated land, water, forest and subsoil use).

    But even before such a synthesis was achieved, the problem of food security of the population was removed, which was obvious to Western experts. Thus, in 1948, the American newspaper “The Washington Post”, touching upon the fact of exhaustion of fertile soils in the U.S. after the ecological catastrophe of the “Dust Bowl", noted that “if the Cold War turns into a long-term conflict, the achievements in respect of land reclamation can solve the question of who will be the winner in this war” [quoted from: Spitsyn, p.19; Brian, p.91-92]. At the same time, the United States definitely lost to the Soviet Union in the matter of agroforestry, because the Great Plains afforestation program progressed only at a rate of 3.3 thousand hectares per year and, being implemented by 12-14%, was curtailed [Bovin, p.93].

    Winding down the Great plan

    In March 1953, i.e. immediately after the assassination of I. V. Stalin, the Ministry of forestry was liquidated and the pace of implementation of the nature transformation plan began to decline sharply [Pisarenko, p. 9; Yarygin, p. 201]. Khrushchev, who seized power, led the onslaught on all large-scale projects designed to increase the population (population) of territories, the manageability of territorial and industrial complexes, the complexity of the Soviet technosphere. At the end of March 1953 the secret decree of the USSR Council of Ministers cancelled the construction of the Main Turkmen canal, a Gravity canal Volga–Ural, the second branch of the Volga-Baltic waterway, waterworks don, Ust-Donetsk port is the polar TRANS-Siberian railway, tunnel under the Tatar Strait and a number of other industrial and infrastructure projects [Spitsyn, p. 140]. The curtailment of the Great plan for the transformation of nature is included in the list of Khrushchev’s “reforms” to dismantle Soviet civilization.

    All work on the state stripes of Saratov - Astrakhan, Stalingrad - Cherkessk, Chapaevsk-Vladimirovka and Mount Vishnevaya - Caspian (total forested area of ​​46.41 thousand hectares) was mothballed; these forests were abandoned for gradual extinction [Koldanov, p.71]. By the fall of 1953, compared with 1952, the proportion of surviving PLNs fell from 95 to 63% [ibid.]. By 1960, the total area of ​​state forest belts was reduced by 2000 ha [Yarygin, p.201]. Along the way, Khrushchev eliminated 570 forest protection stations [Spitsyn, p.21]. In general, for the period 1954-1966. the planting volume of protective forest stands fell to 70 thousand ha / year, and 53% of 950 thousand ha planted during these years remained [Pisarenko, p.9]. These harmful actions led to an ecological catastrophe on the virgin lands in 1962–1963, which undermined the country’s food security, forcing the authorities to sell gold for grain purchases for the first time in the post-war years (600 tons of gold were sold and 13 million tons of grain were purchased) [Spitsyn , p.21]. Thus, the destruction of agriculture by Khrushchev simultaneously put an end to Stalin’s policy of accumulation of gold reserves of the state.

    Only in March 1967. the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR “on urgent measures to protect the soil from wind and water erosion” was adopted, which to a certain extent revived the practice of protective afforestation [Yarygin, p. 201]

    http://stalinism.ru/stalin-i-gosudarstvo/70-let-velikomu-planu-preobrazovaniya-prirody.html


  • 1: survey geobotanical studies (routing); (b) study of vegetation as a forage base; © stationary and semi-stationary studies of forests, the study of the underground part of plant communities (forest and herbaceous), the seed bank and its restoration, etc. Instructions were prepared for each group of programs to carry out the relevant work Zoning of the forest protection afforestation was carried out by such scientists as A.E. Dyachenko (1948), V.A. Bodrov (1940, 1951) and others [Logginov, p.15]. Additional geological (including geomorphological and hydrogeological) and geographical studies were carried out in 1949 by I.P. Gerasimov, N.E. Ivanov, N.I. Nikolaev, N.N. Slavyanov [Koldanov, p.48].

    Since artificially created field-protective forest plantations are expected to bring about deep changes in the composition of the local entomofauna, Soviet zoologists at the early stages of the plan actively began to study the community of insect pests that damage trees and shrubs of the plantations. A large amount of research in this area was carried out by E.N. Pavlovsky, G.Ya. Bei-Bienko, L.V. Arnoldy, M.S. Gilyarov, A.N. Kirichenko, M.N. Nikolskaya, A.A. Richter, G.H. Shaposhnikov, etc. [Bei-Bienko, p.4]. At the same time, ornithologists (Spangenberg E.P., Shaposhnikov L.V., etc.) considered the possibility of regulating the number of pests by natural, ecological methods, i.e. through the introduction of useful bird species into the field protection zones, including by attracting birds. To achieve this goal, it was necessary to solve a number of complex biotechnical problems, because without human intervention, the settlement of artificial plantings by birds occurs quite late (up to 6 years of age, the diversity of ornithofauna varies between 7 and 15 species), and the migratory species are not included in the reserve for settlement [Spangenberg, pp. 3-4, 19; Shaposhnikov].

    In those years and subsequent years of research, it was established that the field protection belts made it possible to regulate a wide range of abiotic environmental factors, primarily microclimatic ones, such as surface air temperature, relative and absolute humidity, snow cover distribution (the length of the snow plume from the forest belts), and snow cover height. Also, forest belts actively influence hydrothermal properties of the soil (temperature in the surface layer, moisture content, structure of soil aggregates, content of toxic salts, etc.) [Gostyshchev, p.39; Mikhin]. In addition, the content of humus and biofilm elements in the zone of influence of FTZs increases, microbiological processes are activated [Gostyshchev, p.39]. All this leads to an increase in the average yield of grain crops under the protection of plantations by 18-23%, industrial crops - by 20-26%, fodder crops - by 29-41% [Ibid.]

    Naturally, the results at different sites varied greatly, since the efficiency and activity of the bands’ influence on the interstrip fields depend on the age of plantations (usually not younger than 3-5 years), on the species composition of the latter, the method of planting, the structure (blown, openworked, openworked, dense), and, in addition, on the local physical and geographical conditions, types and properties of soils. It is important to note that the creation of forest belts will not bring the expected results, if it is not accompanied by other forest engineering works (strip packing, maintenance) and agronomic works (stubble preservation, competent placement of crops, cracking, etc.) [Paramonov, p.34]. Unfortunately, these measures were not observed everywhere, which is why in some places there was a death of the LNP. Later, the consequences of negligence and banal laziness of responsible persons began to be presented by the opponents of the Stalinist plan as evidence of its “thoughtlessness” and even “malignancy”.


  • According to the plan, the forestry plan should consist of a number of small forest belts, “ribbons” (usually 2–4) 60 m wide each with a distance of 300 m between them. In addition, the decree obliged the USSR Ministry of Forestry to take measures to preserve valuable forest areas in the steppe and forest-steppe regions of the European part of the USSR (Shipov Forest, Khrenovsky Bor, Borisoglebsky Forest, Tula Forests, Shatilovsky Forest, Black Forest, Veliko-Anadolsky Forest, Buzuluksky Bor, Leninsky and Manychsky Forestries of the Rostov Region, watershed e woodlands Kuibyshevskaya and Ulyanovsk areas Seigniorial hut, Feodosiyske forestry and forest Beshtaugorsky et al.) [Spitcin, p.20]. “The implementation of all these activities will be a wonderful example of a scientific alteration of the nature of the steppes, which until now has not been known to mankind,” stated one of the most active participants in the acad plan. L.I. Prasolov [Prasolov, p.11].

    Implementation of the plan was entrusted to the Central, regional and local institutions for forest protection under the leadership of the Main Department of forest protection under the Council of Ministers of the USSR [Koldanov, p. 39]. By 1951, the formation of a network of steppe afforestation institutions was completed, which included territorial forest plantation departments, forestry departments, forest protection stations, steppe forestries and forestries, state forest nurseries, expeditions of the design and survey association “Agrolesoproekt".

    As of 1 January 1953, the system of these organizations employed 6,000 professionals with higher and secondary vocational education.

    During the first three years of the plan implementation (from 1949 to 1951) 119 thousand tons of seeds were harvested for the purpose of afforestation, 105 thousand tons of them were acorns, for the transportation of which up to 3000 cars were engaged in every autumn from the places of harvesting to the plantations [Ibid., p.51]. During the same period of time, about 14 billion seedlings were raised in the forest nurseries and other forest management organizations of the USSR, 3890 million of them in 1949 4719 million units in 1950, and in 1951. - 5130 million units. [ibid., p. 52]. Over 4 years, 64.6 thousand hectares of forest crops were planted on the GZLP routes [ibid., P.69].

    Forestry and agronomic measures stipulated by the decree of 1948 required in-depth agrobiological and related studies, which significantly enriched science with knowledge about the design of sustainable agroforestry. When developing and at the initial stage of the implementation of the plan, scientific work was carried out by the All-Union Research Institute of Forestry, the All-Union Research Institute of Agroforestry, the Ukrainian Institute of Agroforestry, the Uzbek Institute of Forestry and the Institute of Agriculture named after V.V. Dokuchaev [ibid., P. 47].The network of scientific institutions included about 20 experimental stations and up to 40 reference points [ibid.]n addition, specialists from the Institute of Forestry, the Komarov Botanical Institute and the Integrated Expedition on Field Protection Forestry developed programs the following programs: