Canada’s pragmatic turn towards China is not without strategic limits
Canada’s pragmatic turn towards China is not without strategic limits
Canada’s pragmatic turn towards China is not without strategic limits
Op-ed by Vina Nadjibulla is Vice-President of Research and Strategy, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 visit to China marked a pragmatic recalibration of Canada–China relations.
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While the trip succeeded in recalibrating relations and reopening dialogue channels, the harder work begins now. Ottawa must manage three interlinked challenges that will determine whether this new approach to China will strengthen Canada’s strategic autonomy or expose it to new risks of strategic dependence.
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The first challenge is managing the risk of economic retaliation from Washington ... If Washington (and Mexico] uses the upcoming 2026 review of the Canada–US–Mexico Agreement to push for deeper economic security alignment and tighten rules around technology controls, investment screening, procurement and supply chains, Canada’s flexibility with China could narrow significantly.
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The arguably more difficult challenge lies at home. Declaring that engagement with China will be selective and subject to guardrails is straightforward. Enforcing those guardrails, especially in sensitive sectors like AI, advanced technologies or critical supply chains where economic opportunity and security concerns overlap, will be much harder.
While China accounts for only about 5 per cent of Canada’s total exports, exposure is uneven and highly sectoral. For example, more than 60 per cent of canola seed exports depend on access to the Chinese market, making the sector highly vulnerable to disruption or coercive trade measures.
Deeper engagement in some sectors will need to proceed alongside deliberate de-risking in others. This also applies to clean energy and green technology investment, areas where Ottawa has signalled interest in deepening cooperation while remaining cautious about exposure to critical infrastructure.
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The third challenge is establishing strategic clarity with allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Taiwan will judge Canada less by the language of its partnership with Beijing than by whether Ottawa continues to deepen cooperation on maritime security, deterrence and resilience, including in the defence of international law in the South China Sea. They will also watch closely for any sign that engagement with Taiwan is being narrowed in the name of improved relations with Beijing.
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Carney’s trip to India, Australia and possibly Japan, planned for March 2026, will be an opportunity to demonstrate that stabilising relations with China is simply one track within a broader strategy centred on middle-power diplomacy and coalition-building. The visit will also offer a chance to reinforce that Canada’s engagement with Beijing sits alongside — not at the expense of — deeper partnerships with like-minded countries, shared approaches to security and resilience and wider efforts to anchor strategic autonomy in a dense network of trusted relationships.