Canada under pressure – How the gap in foreign interference response is eroding democracy | Research
Canada under pressure – How the gap in foreign interference response is eroding democracy | Research
Canada under pressure - How the gap in foreign interference response is eroding democracy: Stephen Nagy | Macdonald-Laurier Institute
When Chinese interference operations in Canada go unaddressed, regional partners draw conclusions about whether Canada can be counted on as a serious security partner in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region.
Foreign interference in Canada is no longer an abstract concern whispered about in security circles. It is a lived reality – one that touches elections, communities, universities, and even the everyday trust that Canadians place in their democratic institutions.
While no single country has a monopoly on these activities, a growing body of evidence shows that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a particularly active and consequential player. The cumulative effect is a slow erosion of sovereignty, confidence, and credibility at a moment when the global rules Canada has long relied upon are fraying.
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[In January 2025, a public inquiry led by Justice Marie-Josée] Hogue concluded that “foreign interference is real” and that “some foreign states (China) are trying to interfere in our democratic institutions, including electoral processes.” The report specifically noted that while Canada’s democratic institutions “have thus far remained robust,” the phenomenon of **foreign interference “poses a major risk to Canadian democracy” **and constitutes “an existential threat” particularly through information manipulation.
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Specific documented cases reinforce these findings including:
- The 2023 arrest and charging of RCMP officer William Majcher under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act for allegedly using his knowledge and contacts to help the Chinese government identify and intimidate individuals who posed credible threats to Chinese state interests (Banerjee 2024; Onishi 2023).
- The ongoing investigation into alleged Chinese police stations operating in Canada without authorization – with RCMP charging three individuals in June 2023 – that demonstrate Chinese operational presence on Canadian soil (Thompson 2024).
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Chinese state interference operations systematically target diaspora communities through intimidation, surveillance, and coercion, creating what experts describe as “transnational repression” (Privy Council Office 2025). The Hogue Commission specifically noted that diaspora communities face “particular vulnerability” to foreign interference, with community members reporting self-censorship due to concerns about family safety in countries of origin.
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Foreign interference extends beyond electoral politics to target research institutions, critical infrastructure, and technology sectors ... [For example] Alliance Canada Hong Kong’s report documented systematic exploitation of Canadian research institutions: “Due to the vulnerable funding environment in Canada, the Communist Party of China utilizes its capital and resources so that it is able to fund specific research in Canadian institutions. In the end, it’ll be able to trade the intellectual property for a very low cost.” The report noted that Canada’s National Research Council had collaborated with entities linked to China’s military-civil fusion strategy, raising concerns about inadvertent technology transfer.
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Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy positions Canada as a reliable partner for regional democracies and a contributor to rules-based order (Global Affairs Canada 2022) ... However, documented Chinese interference operations undermine this positioning in multiple ways.
When Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, New Delhi, and other regional partners observe Chinese state actors successfully penetrating Canadian institutions without robust countermeasures, questions arise about Canada’s commitment and capability as a security partner. The Alliance Canada Hong Kong report notes that “Canada lacks a comprehensive foreign interference framework to address these issues” and that “existing infrastructures in Canada are ill-equipped to address foreign state influence and interference today”
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Policy Recommendations
- Implement Comprehensive Foreign Influence Transparency Legislation ...
- Enhance CSIS Operational Authorities Against Disinformation ...
- Strengthen the Research Security Framework Against IP Theft ...
- Create a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office ...